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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Black/Brown Cooperation and Conflict in the Education  
Policymaking Process.  (August 2006) 
Rene Rolando Rocha, B.A., The University of Texas – Pan American  
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Kenneth J. Meier 
The way race works to shape politics is changing as demographic patterns alter 
the traditional dynamic of race relations throughout the United States.  One pattern is the 
increased tendency of African-Americans and Latinos to reside in the same locality.  
While popular opinion suggests that such contexts should result in the formation of 
“rainbow coalitions,” several scholars have found evidence that inter-minority relations 
are characterized by high levels of political competition.  One of the policy areas in 
which competition has been observed most often is education.  
This dissertation examines the conditions under which African-American/Latino 
relations are likely to be characterized by cooperation or conflict within the education 
policymaking process.  It utilizes a survey of 1800 school districts, containing 96% of all 
urban districts in the United States. The results produced by this study, therefore, are 
applicable to nearly the entire universe of urban educational systems.  Another unique 
aspect of this project is that, rather than focusing on relations at one stage of the policy 
process, it attempts to trace this dynamic through each stage.  Thus, the dissertation 
begins with a look at the circumstances under which Black/Brown electoral coalitions 
will form in school board elections.  The findings suggest that coalition formation is 
   iv
 
contingent upon structural contexts, specifically the presence of partisan elections, and 
upon the citizenship status of the Latino population within a district.  The dissertation 
goes on to trace the cooperative and competitive forces that affect the hiring of African-
American and Latino administrators and teachers.  Lastly, I use theories of bureaucratic 
politics and racial context to study the quality of education received by minority 
students.  I find that, controlling for other factors, more diverse school districts have 
more equitable educational policies.  I also find evidence to support the contention that 
more diverse teaching faculties tend to result in beneficial outcomes for both African-
American and Latino students. 
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1  
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: BLACK/LATINO COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 
How does the political success of African-Americans affect Latinos? Conversely, 
how does the political success of Latinos affect African-Americans? These are the 
central questions of this project.  Studies of racial and ethnic politics within the United 
States have long examined the determinants of African-American political success 
within the context of black-white relations.  The comparatively smaller literature on 
Latino political success has likewise been within the context of Latino-white relations. 
This approach has allowed for a level of simplicity necessary for theory-building 
in growing literatures; meanwhile, the historical geographic dispersion of African-
Americans and Latinos has limited the extent to which a focus on black-white or Latino-
white relations has resulted in an incomplete understanding of racial and ethnic politics 
with the United States.  For example, African-Americans represent the largest share of 
the population in the deep South and mid-Atlantic states: Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Alabama, Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, and 
Delaware.  Latinos, by contrast, are most concentrated in the Southwest states, such as 
California, Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and Colorado.  They also represent a 
large share of the population in states with substantial immigrant populations: New 
York, New Jersey, Florida, and Illinois.  A brief survey of Figures 1.1 and 1.2 shows no 
overlap between heavily African-American and heavily Latino states.   
_______ 
This dissertation follows the style of American Journal of Political Science. 
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Figure 1.1  
States with the Largest Blacks Populations as a Percent of the Total Population 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2  
States with the Largest Latino Populations as a Percent of the Total Population 
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Figure 1.3  
States with the Fast Growing Latino Populations as a Percent of the Total 
Population 
 
 
 
However, minority residential patterns, and consequently minority social and 
political relationships, are not static over time.  Looking at Figure 1.3 we see that the  
more prominent areas of growth for the Latino population include a number of Deep 
South states with traditionally large African-American populations, such as Alabama, 
Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee.  The probability of interaction 
between African-Americans and Latinos has also increased as the size of the Latino 
population has grown over recent years.  In 1980 there were 14.6 million Latinos in the 
United States.  By 1990 there were 23.4 million, and by 2000 there were 35.3 million 
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Latinos, a 141.7% increase over 20 years.  As of 2004 Latinos constituted the largest 
minority group in the nation, comprising 14% of the population (compared to 12.8% for 
African-Americans).  
This change in demographic and residential patterns has one obvious implication 
for political scientists: the politics of race can no longer be reduced to Anglo-African-
American or Anglo-Latino interactions.  Localities are increasingly multiracial 
environments, and a full understanding of the politics of race must account for this.  
Accordingly, scholars have responded to these trends with an increased interest in the 
manner in which minority groups relate to one another, and whether or not those 
relations are characterized by interracial conflict or cooperation (for a review of recent 
studies see Meier, McClain, Wrinkle, and Polinard, 2004).  The extent to which inter-
minority relations are dominated by collaboration or discord holds considerable 
implications for the formation of rainbow coalitions and the general political process in a 
variety of urban settings.   
Black – Latino Relations 
Numerous studies have examined the way racial/ethnic groups interact with one 
another.  Recent work has focused on how these interactions differ under various 
circumstances.  For example, when a political scenario is viewed within a zero-sum 
context (that is, the political benefits under question are limited), we would anticipate a 
higher level of inter-ethnic discord.  When removed from a zero-sum context, however, 
this relationship should be characterized by increased degrees of cooperation (Meier et 
al. 2004).   
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Despite this, inter-minority relations remain heavily influenced by a variety of 
other factors.   de la Garza (1997, 453) suggests that several points are likely responsible 
for the inability of Latinos and African-Americans to form numerous and long-lasting 
rainbow coalitions.  These include: 
1) resentment among many blacks over Latino access to affirmative 
action programs that blacks believe were designed for them 2) tensions 
because of the perception that immigration results in job displacement 
and the reallocation of public resources to Latinos rather than to blacks 
and 3) battles over reapportionment and redistricting. Population is the 
foundation for allocating legislative seats.  The numbers of state 
legislative seats is fixed, while the number of congressional seats 
allocated to each state may vary as a result of the census.  In cities with 
substantial Latino and black populations, these groups often live in 
juxtaposition.   Where Latino population growth greatly exceeds black 
population growth, any increase in legislative seats designed to 
accommodate the growth of the Latino population could come at the 
expense of blacks.  
 
Relying primarily on survey data, the literature thus far has found that support for 
different coalitional strategies varies with economic conditions, perceived social 
distance, experiences with discrimination, income, education, group size, age, political 
integration, and the amount of resources available to each group (Dyer, Vedlitz, and 
Worchel 1989; Jackson, Gerber, and Cain 1994; McClain 1993; Meier and Stewart 
1991a; Garcia 2000).  Garcia (2000) finds that Latino support for programs geared 
towards helping African-Americans increases with education, perception of African-
American discrimination, and levels of political attentiveness.  Jackson, Gerber, and 
Cain (1994) note that blacks in Los Angles report feeling “close” to Latinos when 
compared to national figures.  Age is also a positive influence on support for political 
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strategies that would foster inter-racial cooperation.  As with most previous research, 
socioeconomic status positively affects support for Latino–African-American coalitions.  
Aside from the demographic characteristics that facilitate or hamper efforts to 
form multi-racial coalitions, a number of social and structural variables influence the 
process.  Perceived social distance is perhaps the most often studied of these influences 
(Dyer, Vedlitz, and Worchel 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991a).  Meier and Stewart 
(1991a) point out that while ideological similarity might aid in the creation of rainbow 
coalitions, elevated levels of social distance make such an outcome unlikely.  
Based upon a survey of 1,200 Texas residents, Dyer, Vedlitz, and Worchel 
(1989) note that for most types of social interaction, especially interactions that require 
the formation of a substantial permanent relationship (i.e. intermarriage), both African-
Americans and Latinos preferred to associate with Anglos.  Similarly, Jackson, Gerber, 
and Cain (1994) find that African-Americans nationally are much more likely to identify 
with Anglos than with Latinos.  A sample they drew from the Los Angles area generated 
comparable results.  
The presence of social distance is compounded by the unique ethnic situation in 
which Latinos find themselves.  As the U.S. Census form indicates, Latinos (or 
Hispanics, to use Census terminology) are technically “white” yet constitute a unique 
subgroup within that categorization.  Munoz and Henry (1986, 607) observe that, “most 
Latino political leaders have historically promoted a white identity for Latinos and this 
has contributed to a lack of interest in building rainbow coalitions.”  This approach also 
does not consider the difficulties that may arise when Latinos are considered in non-pan-
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ethnic terms.  Thus, while political ideology would seem to lead minorities to form 
rainbow coalitions, social distance may lead to the formation of alternative coalitional 
arrangements.    
In their examination of this topic, Meier and Stewart (1991b) find that there is a 
tradeoff between African-Americans and Latinos in terms of beneficial education 
policies.  Yet, other studies find that inter-minority coalitions have formed in order to 
contend with problems shared by the African-American and Latino communities, such 
as poor socioeconomic conditions.  Moreover, coalitions have also been observed for 
potential “wedge issues,” such as immigration (Estrada, Garcia, Marcias, and 
Maldonado 1981; Browning Marshall and Tabb 1984; Espiritu 1992).  
Taking this previous literature into account, one might expect inter-minority 
relations to be characterized in several different ways.  Borrowing from the three 
possible scenarios articled in McClain’s (1993, McClain and Karnig 1990) work in this 
areas, there are three general ways in which the political success of African-Americans 
can affect Latinos and vise versa: 
Inter-Minority Cooperation: Gains by African Americans in terms of public policy and 
political representation increase along with gains made by the Latino community and 
vise versa.  
Inter-Minority Conflict: Alternatively, gains by African-Americans in terms of 
public policy and political representation come at the expense of gains made by 
Latinos and vise versa. 
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Inter-Minority Independence: Gains made by one group are unrelated to gains made by 
the other.  
While this literature attempts to uncover which one if these general scenarios 
best characterizes African-American – Latino relations over a host of political activities 
and policy domains, this project is confined to a single policy domain, education.  The 
following chapter presents a political theory of the education process which has been 
tested by numerous scholars and multiple points in time.  It then discusses how this 
framework can be adapted to a discussion of African-American and Latino cooperation 
and conflict.  
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CHAPTER II 
EDUCATION POLICY AND BLACK/LATINO COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 
As of 2000 nearly 21% of all African-American elected officials served on 
school boards (Joint Center 2000).  Meanwhile, a plurality of Latino elected officials, 
42%, held such positions (NALEO 2000).  In Illinois, well over 90% of all Latino 
elected officials were school board members.  This is partially a consequence of the 
substantial amount of minority political efforts for incorporation which have been 
concentrated in areas where the costs of entry are relatively low, such as school boards.  
For example, when Mexican-Americans in south Texas spilt with the Democrats in the 
1970s to form the La Raza Unida Party, they specifically targeted their efforts at 
attempting to gain access to city council and school board seats.  José Ángel Gutiérrez, a 
co-founder of the RUP, objected to organizing and fielding candidates for state and 
federal offices, arguing that such a move would be an inefficient use of the RUP’s 
limited resources (Garcia 1989).  Indeed, the greatest substantive impact which the RUP 
had on the lives of Mexican-Americans in south Texas came a result of their takeover of 
local bodies, such as the school board of Crystal City ISD (Montejano 1987).    
An examination of the relationships between African-Americans and Latinos 
serving on local school boards, therefore, speaks not only to the primary political actors 
within the education policymaking process, but also to the behavior of a large number of 
minority politicians generally.  Moreover, the racial dynamics which appear in school 
boards are also likely to foreshow dynamics in other local, stated, and even federal 
governing bodies.  
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Education and Minority Success in the United States 
Besides low costs of entry, school boards and the education system have been a 
focus of minority activists because of the substantive importance of which education has 
for the lives of racial and ethnic minorities.  Education policy permeates every other 
policy domain.  In their work, Race, Class, and Education, Meier, Stewart and England 
(1989, 10) argue, “education is the single most important area in terms of racial 
discrimination.”  Sustaining this statement is the pervasiveness of disparate treatment for 
African-Americans and Latinos throughout the history of American education (Clotfelter 
2004; Howe 1997; Kozol 1991; Orfield and Eaton1996; Meier, Stewart, and England 
1989; Moses 2002; Oakes 1985; San Miguel 1986, 2001; Valenzuela 1999; Woodson 
1933) and the negative and long-lasting consequences which result from receiving an 
inadequate education.  Put simply, denying individuals that right to a quality education 
affects every other aspect of their life, and minority activists have thus made equality 
within the educational system a high priority (see San Miguel 1986).    
Using data from a national sample of school districts, Table 2.1 illustrates the 
impact of education on income for racial and ethnic minorities.  We see that African-
American per capita income within a district increases by $210.30 with every one point 
increase in the percent of African-American high school graduates.  High school 
education alone can explain 13% of the variance in African-American income.  Latinos, 
however, appear to be less able to translate their educational attainment into increased 
income, likely due to the additional obstacles which Latinos face beyond their status as a 
ethnic minority, such as citizenship status.  According to Table 2.2, a one point increase 
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in the percent of Latino high school graduates within a district is associated with an 
increase in Latino per capita income of $122.60.  Education, however, does explain 
slightly more of the variance in per capita income for Latinos relative to African-
Americans (21% to 13% respectively).  Together, these finding complement other work 
(e.g. Cohen and Tyree 1986), who demonstrate, at the individual level, the higher levels 
of education tend to be coupled with greater economic success. 
 
 
 
Table 2.1 
Impact of African-American Education on African-American 
Income  
OLS Estimates  
Dependent Variable = African-American Per Capita Income  
      t-score  
% African-American High School 
Graduates  $210.30  16.42 
 
Intercept  -4304.21 
R2 0.13 
N 1769 
F 269.54  
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Table 2.2 
Impact of Latino Education on Latino Income  
OLS Estimates  
Dependent Variable = Latino Per Capita Income  
      t-score  
% Latino High School Graduates  $122.60  21.64 
 
Intercept  2166.14 
R2 0.21 
N 1786 
F 468.4  
 
 
Similarly, education reduces poverty rates for both African-Americans and 
Latinos.  With every one point increase in the percent of African-American high school 
graduates, the percentage of African-Americans living in poverty within a district drops 
by .48%.  Likewise, with every one point increase in the percent of Latino high school 
graduates, the percentage of Latinos living in poverty within a district drops by .37%.   
Once again, education proves to be a robust predictor of economic status, explaining 
over 20% of the variance for both African-Americans and Latinos.  To offer two extreme 
(and admittedly unrealistic) examples, the model presented in Table 2.3 suggests that in 
a district in which no African-Americans held a high school diploma, 50.08% of 
African-Americans would be living in poverty.  However, were every African-American 
within a district a high school graduate, only 6.08% of African-Americans would be 
impoverished.  Table 2.4 shows that poverty among the Latinos would fall from 40.29% 
to 3.29% as the level of education among Latinos moved with its smallest to its highest 
possible value.    
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Table 2.3 
Impact of African-American Education on African-American 
Poverty 
OLS Estimates  
Dependent Variable = % African-Americans Living in Poverty 
      t-score  
% African-American High School 
Grauates  -0.48 -25.51 
       
Intercept  54.08 
R2 0.27 
N 1743 
F 650.73  
 
 
Table 2.4 
Impact of Latino Education on Latino Poverty 
OLS Estimates  
Dependent Variable = % Latino Living in Poverty 
      t-score  
% Latino High School Grauates  -0.37 -23.45 
       
Intercept  40.29 
R2 0.24 
N 1784 
F 549.93  
 
 
Having illustrated the extent to which education affects the quality of life for 
African-Americans and Latinos, we see that minorities have a variety of incentives to 
ensure that they maximize their influence on the education system.  This is typically 
done through the election of minorities to local school boards.  Doing so, however, 
requires substantial resources, the most obvious of which is group size.  Previous 
research finds that African-Americans are relatively successful at translating group size 
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into access to school boards seats.  In fact, Meier, Stewart, and England (1989) find that, 
within the average school district in their sample, African-Americans are proportionally 
represented on local school board given their population size.  Latinos, for reasons 
discussed in later chapters, suffer from under representation on most boards.  Meier and 
Stewart’s (1991a) study estimates this under representation to be around 15%.   
Electoral success, of course, is also contingent upon socioeconomic conditions.  
The conversion of minority group size into minority political office holding requires 
electoral participation, and therefore, socioeconomic resources (Verba, Scholzman, and 
Brady 1995).  Region can also be a crucial factor.  This is most noticeable for African-
Americans, who generally are at an electoral disadvantage in South (Meier, Stewart, and 
England 1989).  Since the passage of the Voting Rights Act, significant scholarly 
attention has also been paid to the effect of electoral structure on minority electoral 
success, with most studies finding that at-large elections reduce levels of minority 
representation (Arrington and Watts 1991; Engstrom and McDonald 1986; Leal, 
Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004; Meier, Gonzalez-Juenke, Wrinkle, and Polinard 2005; 
Robinson and Dye 1978; Robinson and England 1981).  These relationships can be 
summarized in Figure 2.1   
Borrowing from a similar set of investigations with the urban political tradition, 
scholars of education politics have repeatedly demonstrated that increased descriptive 
representation for minority groups on local school boards results in greater share of 
administrative positions within a district (Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Polinard, 
Wrinkle, and Longoria 1990; Wright, Hirlinger, and England 1998), similar to the way 
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Figure 2.1 
A Model of Minority Access to School Board Seats 
 
 
 
 
in which representation on city councils has been found to increase the percentage of 
minority municipal employees (Dye and Renick 1981; Kerr and Mladenka 1994; 
Mladenka 1989a, 1989b).  While most school board’s only direct administrative hire is 
the superintendent, boards can also put forward formal policies or informal pressure to 
encourage the hiring of additional minority administrators.  Minority administrators, in 
turn, can use their discretion to hire more minority teachers.  
Like minority representation on school boards, environmental influences are also 
likely to have a considerable impact on the presence of minorities within the education 
bureaucracy.  First, minorities must be present within the local labor market, which 
requires group size as well as socioeconomic resources (specifically as college degree).  
Population growth rates can also be a crucial factor in minority employment within the 
education system; this issue is particularly important for Latinos.  Employment patterns 
are inertial, and may represent patterns of political empowerment and residency form 
Board Seats 
Region 
Electoral 
Structure 
Group Size 
Socioeconomic 
Resources 
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previous times.  Relatively new groups are at a disadvantage, therefore, and must rely on 
replacements or the expansion of positions in order to exercise their newfound influence 
on public employment patterns.  In other words, without high employee turnover, the 
ability of district to adapt and reflect the current demographic make up of a district will 
be restricted, thus lowering the degree to which population size appears to predict 
employment within the for emerging populations.  Figure 2.2 offers an illustration of 
these relationships.   
Once employed, minorities have the ability to directly affect policy outputs and 
outcomes.  Drawing on insights from the representative bureaucracy literature, which 
argues that descriptive representation within organizations leads to the active 
representation of a group’s interests (Hindera 1993a, 1993b; Selden 1997; Selden, 
Brudney, and Kellough 1998), several studies have sought to determine the  
 
 
Figure 2.2 
A Model of Minority Access to Administrative and Teaching Positions 
 
 
Population  
Growth 
Group Size 
Socioeconomic 
Resources 
Board Seats 
Administrative Positions 
Teaching Positions 
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consequences of increased diversity among teachers for the education of minority 
students. Specifically, work in this area has attempted to uncover whether there exists a 
link between the presence of minority teachers and the use of academic grouping and 
discipline in a discriminatory manner so that students from one racial/ethnic group are 
separated from another, a set of practices or informal policies often referred to as 
“second-generation discrimination.”  Generally, these studies find that levels of second 
generation discrimination are lower in districts where minorities comprise a large share 
of the teaching faculty (Barajas and Pierce 2001; Irvine 1989; Polinard, Wrinkle, and 
Longoria 1990; Polinard, Wrinkle, and Meier 1995; Weiher 2000; Wright, Hirlinger, and 
England 1998).  Researchers in this area have also moved beyond questions of overt 
discrimination by examining the ramification of teacher diversity on other policy 
outputs, such as student performance on standardized testing (Meier, Wrinkle, and 
Polinard 1999; Weiher 2000).  
Meier and Stewart (1992) demonstrate that the effect of minority employment on 
second-generation discrimination occurs primarily through the hiring of minority 
teachers, not administrators, confirming Thompson’s (1976) contention that the 
translation of descriptive representation into substantive representation is most likely to 
occur at the “street-level” where bureaucrats enjoy considerably more discretion and 
have been subject to less organizational socialization.   
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The amount of discretion teachers possess is also likely to be a function of school 
district size.  Larger school districts are assumed to be more professionalized (see Meier, 
Stewart, and England 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991a; Wright, Hirlinger, and England 
1998).  Greater professionalization should result in a greater resistance toward using 
academic groupings for purposes other than their original educational function, such as 
second generation discrimination.  
Once again, there is reason to suspect that socioeconomic conditions are a prime 
determinant of minority wellbeing within the education system.  Discrimination, such as 
academic grouping or this misuse of disciplinary policies, is easier to perpetrate against 
individuals with few socioeconomic resources and serves to limit the extent to which 
hostile attitudes can be translated into discriminatory behavior, as minority groups will 
be more apt to challenge discriminatory behavior through political or legal means.   
A final explanation of discriminatory education policies within US school 
districts is racial/ethnic heterogeneity (Hero 1998; Hero and Tolbert 1996; Oswald, 
Coutinho, and Best 2002; St. John and Lewis 1971).  Hero’s (1998; Hero and Tolbert 
1996) work on the influence of racial/ethnic diversity and public policy suggests that 
diversity is likely to be positively related to educational equity.  As Hero (1998, 101) 
writes, “where small minority populations are present minorities often have high 
disparate outcomes, and those disparate outcomes may actually be relatively higher in 
more homogenous environments.”  He argues that this occurs because homogeneous 
environments are characterized by “consensual pluralism,” and political disputes are 
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unlikely revolve around issues of racial/ethnic equity.  These relationships can be 
summarized in Figure 2.3. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 
A Model of Minority Second Generation Discrimination 
 
 
 
This explanation of minority student outcomes heavily emphasizes the 
importance of achieving descriptive representation at each level of the educational 
system (see Figure 2.4).  Increases in representation at one level of authority, according 
to this framework, translates into representation at other levels.  At the lowest level of 
the system, teachers in the classroom with students, this descriptive representation 
positively influences the fortunes of minority students.  Work in the field of education 
provides a variety of causal mechanisms for this relationship.  Minority teachers can  
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Figure 2.4  
A Model of Minority Access within the US Education System  
 
 
 
 
serve as role models for minority students, but may also increase minority student 
success through increased expectations and a greater eagerness of students to meet those 
expectations (Irvine 1989).  Teachers, the “street-level bureaucrats” of the education 
system, also enjoy considerable discretion in the implementation of policies, providing a 
way though which they can also influence policy outcomes, such as those related to 
second generation discrimination, for minority students.  In sum, this framework 
Environment 
Board Seats 
Administrative Positions 
Teaching Positions 
Student Outcomes 
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suggests that student outcomes for racial and ethnic minorities are a function of minority 
representation among teaching faculties and lower-level administration.  The 
representation, then, is partially determined by presence of minority representation at 
higher levels of administration.  Ultimately, electoral politics and the ability of 
minorities to gain access to seats on local school boards influence the hiring of 
administrators, and consequently, indirectly influence minority student outcomes.  Each 
one of these stages can potentially be an arena for African-American and Latino 
cooperation or conflict.  I elaborate on this point below.  
Inter-Minority Relations and the Politics of Education 
As Cohen and Tyree (1986, 812) write, “while education helps most of us get 
ahead economically, its value for children of poverty is particularly great.”  
Consequently, the extent to which African-American - Latino relations in the education 
system are characterized by cooperation or conflict holds considerable implications for 
the future of both groups.  Education, however, is a forum in which inter-minority 
relations have been characterized as tenuous within recent years (de la Garza 1997; Hero 
and Clarke 2003; Meier and Stewart 1991a, 1991b; Meier, McClain, Wrinkle, and 
Polinard 2004; Sidney 2002; Vaca 2004).  In other policy arenas both Latinos and 
African-Americans are likely to benefit from redistributive policies.  However, within 
the educational system redistributing resources to Latino-targeted programs, such as 
bilingual education, often limits the resources available to African-Americans and other 
non-Latino students.   
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Referring specifically to the education policymaking process, Hero and Clarke 
(2003, 326) argue that “Latinos and blacks bring different experiences and 
preferences…so the prospects of multiethnic coalitions are tenuous.”  Similarly, de la 
Garza (1997) maintains that school reform is one of four prime causes of political 
tension between the African-American and Latino communities within recent years.  
Despite such highly conflictual portrayals of the education policymaking process, it 
would be disingenuous to imply that the vast majority of school board decisions are 
contentious and divisive.  Rather, most of the issues taken up by school boards, as with 
other forms of local government, are resolved by unanimous or near-unanimous votes 
(Polinard, Wrinkle, Longoria, and Binder 1994).  Thus, while race may not shape every 
deliberation undertaken by local governing institutions, where issues (e.g. funding for 
bilingual education) are framed in racial/ethnic terms, contention and voting blocs are 
likely to form.   
Thus, the first opportunity for competition or cooperation occurs in electoral 
settings.  Elected representatives, in turn, have the option to either develop a cooperative 
relationship with other minority groups, or to seek to maximize benefits for their co-
ethnics at the expense of other groups.  Borrowing the framework illustrated in Figure 
2.5, we see that this is can be done through the discretion they possess in setting general 
policy goals and selecting high-level bureaucratic administrators.  Administrators, in 
turn, develop more specific policies and hire street-level bureaucrats (teachers) who 
actually implement policies and produce policy outputs.  The bureaucracy, then, presents 
another forum where African-American and Latino competition or cooperation can  
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Figure 2.5 
Possible Points of African-American and Latino Cooperation and Conflict within 
the Education Policymaking Process  
 
 
 
 
 
 
occur.  Administrators can use their discretion in hiring and developing specific policies 
to maximize benefits for specific co-ethnics or for multiple racial/ethnic minorities.  The 
same is true for street-level bureaucrats.  The dynamic of Black/Brown relations, 
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however, can conceivably differ dramatically within the bureaucracy, and each of these 
potential points of conflict or cooperation warrant individual attention.   
Accordingly, each chapter in this project examines one of these junctions.  
Chapter III begins with an examination of whether African-Americans and Latinos tend 
to form coalitions with one another in the election local school board members.  In 
Protest is not Enough, Browning, Marchall, and Tabb (1984) argue that Latino 
representation is improved by the formation of coalitions with African-Americans and 
liberal Anglos. However, much of the literature has noted a surprising absence of such 
rainbow coalitions, and only limited attitudinal support for their formation (Dyer et al. 
1989; de la Garza 1997; Garcia 2000; Mindiola 2002).   Meier and Stewart (1991a) 
maintain that this is an anticipated consequence of the “power thesis,” which suggests 
that the level of social distance between racial/ethnic groups determines the likelihood 
that the groups will enter into a coalitional relationship or one of electoral competition.  
Meier and Stewart (1991a) go on to argue that, “if the dominant Anglo group is forced to 
chose between Hispanic and black groups for coalition purposes, the power thesis 
suggests that, all things being equal, they will seek a coalition with Hispanics.”  
However, the findings here suggest that, contrary to the predictions of the power thesis, 
there is little evidence of Anglo-Latino coalitions.  There are, however, indications that 
Anglo-black coalitions may form when an area becomes increasingly populated by 
Latino non-citizens, possibly due to the increased social distance this causes between 
Latinos and other racial/ethnic communities.  Lastly, nonpartisan systems are 
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characterized by greater degrees of inter-minority electoral competition than are partisan 
systems.    
Chapter IV seeks to determine whether African-American – Latino relations are 
characterized by cooperation or conflict in the translation of political representation into 
bureaucratic office holdings.  Competition over descriptive representation within the 
bureaucracy is one of the most studied areas within the literature on inter-minority 
relations (McClain and Karnig 1990; McClain 1993; Meier et al. 2004).  It is also among 
the most prominent issues concerning inter-minority relations in the educational system.  
de la Garza (1997) claims “tensions resulting from Latino population growth that 
produces Latino majorities in schools that previously had black majorities, 
administrators and staff” to be among the four main explanations for the failure of long-
lasting rainbow coalitions to materialize in recent years.  McClain (1993) finds evidence 
that representational gains on the part of African-Americans are likely to negatively 
affect Latinos, while gains made by Latinos do not necessarily limit African-American 
opportunities.  McClain (1993; McClain and Karnig 1990; McClain and Tauber 1998), 
however, models African-American and Latino competition for municipal employment 
through a series of simple and partial correlations, which only allows her to test whether 
municipalities with a larger number of African-American employees tend to employ less 
Latinos and vice versa.  McClain’s study does not consider how minority political 
representation affects the municipal employment of other minority groups, so no 
conclusions can be drawn regarding African-American and Latino legislative 
cooperation.  Chapter III takes up this question.  More succinctly, it asks if the positive 
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effects of African-American representation strengthened, weakened, or unaffected by the 
presence of Latino representation? Conversely, are the positive effects of Latino 
representation strengthened, weakened, or unaffected by the presence of African-
American representation? Examining these questions also makes an important 
advancement beyond the simple covariance models used in other works.  Within 
education, this is done by examining whether African-Americans and Latinos are better 
or less able to substantively represent their group’s interest on school boards on which 
both groups serve.  The findings offer no evidence that the hiring of African-Americans 
administrators is affected by the presence of Latinos on the board.  However, Latino 
political representation has less of a positive impact on the percentage of Latino 
administrators when Latinos serve on boards alongside African-Americans.  For reasons 
discussed in Chapter III, this relationship is also not as straightforward as it would 
initially appear.   
Chapter V turns to actually policy outcomes and the street-level of the American 
education system, examining how African-American – Latino relations affect levels of 
“second-generation discrimination” among minority students.  The educational system 
provides an excellent opportunity to test for the presence of African-American/Latino 
competition in policy implementation due to the considerable amount of discretion and 
autonomy that teachers and administrators enjoy.  This chapter produces two primary 
findings.  First, it reaffirms that notion that racial discrimination is contingent upon 
socioeconomic status.  When minority groups look similar to Anglos in terms of 
socioeconomic status, the level of discrimination they face within the education system 
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is reduced.  However, the relative status of other minority groups matters as well.  When 
the difference between African-Americans and Anglos is large and the difference 
between Latinos and Anglos is small, African-Americans are especially vulnerable.  The 
same holds true for Latinos when the African-Americans find themselves relatively 
better off in terms of income and education.  Second, this study extends the literature on 
representative bureaucracy by examining whether minority students benefit from the 
presence of non-co-ethnic minorities on teaching faculties.  Surprisingly, the findings 
suggest that not only do non-co-ethnic minority teachers lower levels of second 
generation discrimination among minority students; they do so consistently and with a 
substantive impact that occasionally rivals that of co-ethnic teachers. 
The National Latino Education Study 
The bulk of the data for this study are taken from the National Latino Education 
Study, a national sample of school districts conducted in 2001.  The National Latino 
Education Study contains information on the racial/ethnic composition of school boards 
as well as the electoral system used to elect members, such as the presence of at-large or 
ward elections.  It also contains information about the demographic makeup of each 
district’s employees.  The NLES surveyed every school district in the nation with a 
student enrollment over 5000 and yielded a response rate of 96%.  This results in a total 
sample of 1831 districts across 49 states, 1672 of which elect their board members.  The 
size and geographic diversity of this sample presents a substantial improvement over 
samples used in previous studies.  For example, Fraga et al.’s (1986) sample size is 35 
districts, Marschall’s (2005) is 196, Meier and Stewart’s (1991a) is 118, and Polinard et 
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al.’s (1994) is 64, Robinson and England’s (1981) is 75, and Welch and Karnig’s (1978) 
is 43. 
 Data regarding the demographic makeup of each school district is obtained from 
the 2000 census.  Census data includes the racial composition of the district, the average 
level of socioeconomic resources (e.g. educational attainment, income, and home 
ownership) present in each community by race.  It also contains information about the 
citizenship status of district residents.   
The Office for Civil Rights gathers periodic data regarding academic grouping, 
discipline, and educational attainment.  Unfortunately, the OCR typically collects data 
from a small sample of districts nationwide.  In 2000, however, the OCR conducted a 
national sample, gathering multiple measures of student performance by race.  
Combining the National Latino Education Study with Census and OCR data makes it 
possible to trace African-American – Latino relations from the electoral arena through 
the bureaucracy and the implementation stage.   
Table 2.5 offers some descriptive statistics for the set of districts included in the 
survey.  The mean African-American population is 10.44%, slightly under their overall 
population size as of 2000.  Latinos represent 13% of the population in the average 
district in this study.  Minority populations tend to be young, and we see that 
demonstrated in the data, with the average district having a student population which is 
15.4% African-American and 15.6% Latino.   
Latinos appear to be doing far less well than African-Americans in terms of 
teaching positions, with African-Americans representing 7.1% of all teachers within the 
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average districts, compared to 5.37% for Latinos.  This difference is even more 
pronounced for administrators, where African African-Americans comprise 10.36% of  
 
 
Table 2.5 
Some Characteristics of the Districts Included in this Study  
 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  
   
Total Student Enrollment  16701.06 37862.36 
   
% Blacks Living in the District  10.44 14.11 
   
% Latinos Living in the District  12.95 18.40 
   
% Blacks with a High School Diploma  73.28 16.30 
   
% Latinos with a High School Diploma  66.10 17.90 
   
% Blacks Living in Poverty 18.98 14.53 
   
% Latinos Living in Poverty 15.71 13.68 
   
% Black Students 15.42 19.93 
   
% Latino Students  15.66 22.19 
   
% Black Teachers 7.10 11.83 
   
% Latino Teachers 5.37 11.80 
   
% Black Administrators 10.36 15.38 
   
% Latino Administrators 5.58 13.09 
   
% Black School Board Members 10.23 16.79 
   
% Latino School Board Members 5.67 16.23 
 
30  
all administrators within the average districts, compared to 5.58% for Latinos.  That 
African-Americans and Latinos seem to be better represented among administrators than 
teachers is also a trend worth noting.   
The advantage which African-Americans enjoy over Latinos in terms of 
employment within the education system may be a function of a greater level of political 
incorporation.  The average district has a school board in which African-Americans 
make up 10.23% of the members, while Latino incorporation is a substantially lower 
5.67%.  
Conclusion 
My hope is that this project will allow for a more complete understanding of how 
the dynamics of African-American – Latino relations shift in accordance with the 
differing actors and incentives for cooperation that exist at various stages of the 
policymaking process.  Indeed, this is the first work to trace inter-minority relations from 
the electoral arena through to the policy implementation process.  Other works (e.g. 
Meier and Stewart 1991a) have examined similar questions at multiple stages of the 
policy process; however, inter-minority relations have never been the prime focus of any 
such study.  Moreover, this study will utilize a dataset which is relatively recent and 
more comprehensive than that which previous research has relied on.  
The setting of this work in the educational system makes it one of substantial 
importance.  Equality of education is an especially salient issue to normative theorists 
and political activists.  Few, if any, bureaucracies affect the lives of individuals to the 
same extent as public schools.  Inter-minority relations in this arena are likely to set the 
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stage for relations in other political settings, such social welfare policies.  Nonetheless, 
my hope is also this work will speak to scholars beyond the field of education policy, 
such as those in urban politics who have historically been greatly concerned with the 
delivery of governmental services (policy implementation) and electoral relationships. 
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CHAPTER III 
INTERRACIAL COALITIONS IN LOCAL SCHOOL BOARD ELECTIONS 
This chapter attempts to improve upon our understanding of the nature of inter-
minority coalitions in the election of the chief policymakers within the U.S. education 
system, school board members.  Specific attention is paid to the “power thesis,” a 
hypothesis first proposed by Meier and Stewart (1991a, 1991b) that predicts the failure 
of rainbow coalitions and the formation of Anglo-Latino coalitions.  Additionally, the 
influence of structural variables on the formation of interracial coalitions is reexamined, 
with the primary emphasis placed on the presence of partisan elections.   
The Logic behind Interracial Coalitions  
As discussed in the introduction, inter-minority relations are heavily influenced 
by a variety of factors.  Once again, de la Garza (1997, 453) points to several conditions 
which he argues have contributed to the inability of Latinos and African-Americans to 
form numerous and long-lasting rainbow coalitions.  These include resentment among 
many African-Americans over Latino access to affirmative action programs, the 
perception that immigration results in job displacement and the reallocation of public 
resources to Latinos rather than to African-Americans, battles over reapportionment and 
redistricting, and tensions resulting from Latino population growth that produces Latino 
majorities in schools that previously had African-American majorities, administrators 
and staff.  Paula McClain’s research has long noted the existence of socioeconomic and 
political competition between African-Americans and Latinos (McClain and Karning 
1990; McClain 1993; McClain and Tauber 1998, 2001).  Her work in this area suggests 
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that representational gains on the part of African-Americans are likely to affect Latinos 
negatively, although gains made by Latinos do not necessarily limit African-American 
opportunities (McClain 1993).   
Despite such findings, which seem to point to the presence of inter-minority 
competition in a number of localities within the United States, there remains an elegant 
and compelling logic as to why one would expect rainbow coalitions to form in a variety 
of circumstances.  In Protest is not Enough, for example, Browning, Marchall, and Tabb 
(1984) argue that Latino representation is improved by the formation of coalitions with 
African-Americans and liberal Anglos.  Forming rainbow coalitions allows African-
Americans and Latinos to inflate their electoral strength, gain office, and promote 
policies in the interest of both groups.  Refusing to form such coalitions carries with it 
the risk that conservative Anglos will dominate governing coalitions, resulting in 
policies hostile to the interests of minority groups.   
Given that the literature on African-American – Latino relations has noted a 
surprising absence of rainbow coalitions (see Vaca 2004), scholars have been left to 
wonder why alternate racial coalitions routinely form.  One such explanation comes 
from the sociological concept of “perceived social distance.” In its simplest form, social 
distance refers to the amount and nature of social relationships that members of two 
groups are willing to engage in and is often measured using survey questions similar to 
those first employed by Bogardus (1928).1      
                                                 
1 Bogardus’s social distance scale asks respondents the following survey item: “Which 
best represents your comfort level in interacting with this social group 1) Close kinship 
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Work dealing with the concept of social distance indicates that African-
Americans and Latinos rarely possess attitudes conducive to inter-minority affability and 
social networks.  Latinos are usually more likely to favor social association with Anglos 
and Anglos typically reciprocate.  This is especially true for more intimate forms of 
association, such as intermarriage (Dyer, Vedlitz, and Worchel 1989).   
Of course, interracial attitudes, including those comprising measures of social 
distance, vary considerably in different social and economic contexts.  For this reason, 
researchers argue that the influence of race on social distance can be either exacerbated 
or mitigated by socioeconomic conditions.  When the Latino community is similar to the 
Anglo community in terms of socioeconomic status, the argument suggests that African-
Americans become less desirable coalition partners (Meier and Stewart 1991a, 1991b; 
Kaufmann 2004).  There are also some indications that the reverse is true.  That is, when 
the Latino community does not possess ample socioeconomic resources, African-
Americans may benefit from a more collegial relationship with the local Anglo 
population (Randall and Delbridge 2005).  In short, social distance is partially 
determined by a group’s social status generally and is therefore heavily influenced by 
socioeconomic factors.   
Utilizing arguments made in the social distance literature, Giles and Evans’ 
(1985, 1986) present what they term the “power thesis,” which suggests that the amount 
                                                                                                                                                
by marriage 2) My Club as Personal Chums (often modified in contemporary surveys as 
“Close Friendship”) 3) Neighbors on my street 4) Employment in my occupation 5) 
Citizenship in the country 6) Visitors only to my country 7) Would exclude from my 
country.”  
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of social distance between two individuals determines their willingness to engage in 
cooperative or competitive behavior.  Meier and Stewart (1991a, 1991b; also see Feagin 
1980) extend their logic and develop an aggregated version of this hypothesis.  The 
Meier and Stewart hypothesis argues that the level of social distance between 
racial/ethnic groups determines whether groups will enter into a coalitional relationship 
or one in which they compete for electoral representation and beneficial public policies.  
Thus, Meier and Stewart argue that social distance not only explains social relationships 
between groups but also affects the political behavior of groups toward one another.   
Viewed from the perspective of the power thesis, it is not unexpected that much 
of the literature has noted an absence of rainbow coalitions and only limited attitudinal 
support for their formation (Dyer et al. 1989; de la Garza 1997; Garcia 2000; Mindiola 
2002).  As Meier and Stewart (1991a, 100) suggest, “if the dominant Anglo group is 
forced to choose between Hispanic and black groups for coalition purposes, the power 
thesis suggests that, all things being equal, they will seek a coalition with Hispanics.”  
Similar observations regarding Anglo preferences for coalition partners continue to be 
made in more contemporary studies, such as Kaufmann’s (2004) work on the interplay 
between racial conflict and mayoral voting in American cities.  She writes:  
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For moderate whites, Latinos are simply more attractive coalition 
partners.  For Latinos, these alliances have resulted in greater levels of 
political influence and incorporation than they might have otherwise had 
in black-led coalitions…The big losers in these new political 
arrangements between Latinos and moderate whites have been urban 
blacks, who become quite dispensable to these governing regimes (205-
206).  
 
Hypotheses 
 
Empirically, however, it is difficult to distinguish between each of the possible 
scenarios.  For example, the presence of a rainbow coalition would imply that as the size 
of the African-American population within an area grows, Latino representation would 
likewise increase (for the rainbow coalition should be wielding greater electoral 
strength).  Yet, the power thesis predicts a similar set of results, but for very different 
reasons.  That is, as the size of the African-American population increases Anglos have a 
greater incentive to form coalitions with Latinos.  Thus, once again, we would expect to 
see Latino representation increase as a result of an increase in the size of the African-
American population.   
Fortunately, the two hypotheses do make substantially different predictions 
regarding the relationship between the size of the Latino population and African-
American representation.  If a rainbow coalition is present, an increase in the Latino 
population should naturally increase the degree to which African-Americans are 
represented (once again, the coalition’s electoral strength is growing).  Conversely, if the 
power thesis is correct, we would expect to see a negative relationship between Latino 
population size and African-American representation.  This occurs because Anglos will 
not be inclined to form coalitions with African-Americans but will take advantage of the 
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presence of a sizeable Latino population to limit African-American opportunities.2 This 
leads to the following hypotheses: 
Black-Latino (Rainbow) Coalition: 
African-American population size is positively associated with Latino representation in 
elected office.   
Latino population size is positively associated with African-American representation in 
elected office.    
Anglo-Latino Coalition (Power Thesis):  
African-American population size is positively associated with Latino representation in 
elected office.   
Latino population size is negatively associated with African-American representation in 
elected office.  
Neither scenario predicts that African-American population size will be 
negatively associated with Latino representation in elected office (that is, the formation 
of an Anglo-black coalition).  However, drawing on the framework set up by the power 
thesis and evidence presented by scholars of Latino immigration, there might be reason 
to suspect that Anglo-black coalitions are possible.  The power thesis’ applicability to 
                                                 
2 These predictions are laid out by Meier and Stewart (1991a) who write: “the key test 
for choosing between the rainbow thesis and the power thesis is what happens to black 
representation when Latino numbers increase.  The power thesis holds that an increase in 
Latino population would be unlikely to increase Anglo votes for blacks, because blacks 
are less similar to Anglos than are Latinos.  The relationship between Latino population 
and black representation in this case should be negative.  The rainbow thesis, on the 
other hand, contends that as Latino population increases, the potential for a rainbow 
coalition increases.  The correlation between Latino population and black representation, 
therefore, should be positive (1128).”   
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Anglo-Latino coalitions assumes conflict is a function of the level of social distance 
between groups and that Anglos will be most likely to seek a coalition with the group or 
groups which most resemble themselves (typically assumed to be Latinos).  Yet, how 
have these traditional relationships been changed by recent immigration tends? With the 
size of the foreign born population increasing by 43% between 1990 and 2000 (Jones-
Correa 2001), scholars have begun to examine how coalitional relationships are altered 
by the infusion of a large Latino immigrant population.  
  Latino Immigration and the Power Thesis  
Based upon a series of interviews with Houston residents, Mindiola et al. (2002, 
61) present anecdotal evidence that Latino immigrants sometimes believe Anglo-black 
coalitions to be more likely than Anglo-Latino coalitions due to the cultural and 
linguistic differences between Anglos and Latino immigrants.  This serves as an 
illustration of an alternative to the traditional predictions of the power thesis, suggesting 
that Anglo-Latino social distance may occasionally be greater than Anglo-black social 
distance, resulting in the occasional formation of Anglo-black political coalitions.   
Several other studies have examined how immigration influences Anglo and 
African-American attitudes toward new immigrant populations, especially Latinos.  For 
example, Sears et al. (1999) find that African-Americans are more likely to oppose  
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liberal immigration policies if they sense economic competition with Latinos.3 
Regarding Anglo behavior, Kaufmann (2004) observes that Anglos who believe that 
local government pays too much attention to recent immigrants were more likely to vote 
for Giuliani in the 1993 New York mayoral race.  This finding remains when she splits 
her sample to only examine the voting behavior of politically moderate Anglos, although 
she does not find a relationship between immigration attitudes and voting for Riordan in 
the Los Angles mayoral race held that same year.  Lastly, a recent survey of residents in 
a North Carolina country with a rapidly growing Latino immigrant population finds that 
African-Americans and Anglos express lower levels of social distance to each other than 
they do toward any other group (Randall and Delbridge 2005).4 
Furthering the predictions of this alternative interpretation of the power thesis are 
the attitudes of Latino immigrants themselves.  For example, Mindiola et al. (2002) find 
that Latino immigrants often express very negative feelings regarding black-Latino 
social association.  When considered along side other works which suggest that Latinos 
perceive a greater degree of commonality with African-Americans at higher levels of 
acculturation (Kaufmann 2003) and that support for coalitional strategies increases with 
                                                 
3 Work by Waldinger (2001) suggests that fears related to economic competition with 
Latinos are well founded.  He notes that in many areas Latino immigrants are more 
likely to find “adequate” employment than African-Americans, possibly due to higher 
levels of immigrant social capital and the selection bias of individuals inherent in the 
immigration process.  
 
4 Previous research by political scientists has found trends similar to those noted by 
sociologists.  For example, Jackson, Gerber, and Cain (1994) note that African-
Americans are more likely to perceive themselves to be “close” to Anglos than they are 
to Latinos.   
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political integration (Garcia 2000), we have reason to suspect that Latino immigrants 
will often not be receptive to African-American overtures, should they be made.     
The following scenario can be generated from this alternative interpretation of 
Meier and Stewart’s power thesis:  
African-American population size will be negatively associated with Latino 
representation in elected office.  
Latino population size is positively associated with African-American representation in 
elected office.    
More specifically, this revised version of the power thesis argues that:   
The size of the Latino immigrant population will be positively associated with African-
American representation in elected office.    
This relationship occurs not because Latino immigrants are rallying behind 
African-American candidates, but rather because Anglos, who perceive Latino 
immigrants to be socially distant from them, are more likely to incorporate African-
Americans into governing coalitions in districts with large Latino immigrant 
populations.   
Modeling African-American and Latino Representation 
 
  The data for this study are taken from the National Latino Education Study, a 
national sample of school districts conducted in 2001, which contains information on the 
racial/ethnic composition of school boards as well as the electoral system used to elect 
members.  Although the NLES contains a total of of 1831 districts across 49 states, only 
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1672 elect their board members.  The size and geographic diversity of this sample 
presents a substantial improvement over samples used in previous studies.   
As the power thesis focuses on the level of African-American and Latino 
representation, the dependent variable examined here is the percentage of African-
American/Latino school board members. An alternative way to account for the level of 
minority representation would be the parity (or proportional representation) measure 
used by, among others, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984).  There are several 
reasons, however, why operationalizing minority representation as the percentage of 
African-American or Latino board members is preferable to this approach.  The parity 
measure generates the same value for all districts in which there are no minority board 
members regardless of the size of the minority population (in this instance, all districts 
receive a score of zero).  Thus, the parity measure treats a district in which Latinos hold 
no seats and constitute 5% of the population the same as a district in which Latinos hold 
no seats and constitute 50% of the population, even though the cases are qualitatively 
different from one another.  For this reason, Engstrom and McDonald (1981) argue that 
studies of minority representation on local boards should use the percentage of minority 
board members as the dependent variable and control for the size of the minority 
population.  They write: “under this approach, proportionality is a relationship across a 
set of data points, each of which reflects the specific black proportions of the population 
and the council for a city.  The fact that all cities without a black council member do not 
have the same black population percentage is taken into account in estimating this 
relationship (346).” Beyond this methodological criticism of the parity measure, there 
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are theoretical reasons why the Engstrom and McDonald (1981) modeling approach is 
preferable.  Several studies demonstrate that increases in the percentage of minority 
school board members, regardless of parity, result in a greater level of minority 
substantive representation (see Fraga et al. 1986; Marschall 2005; Meier and Stewart 
1991a; Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Polinard, Wrinkle, and Longoria 1990; 
Polinard et al. 1994; Wright, Hirlinger, and England 1998).  In other words, Latinos 
should find their substantive interests better represented in a district in which they hold 
28% of seats and constitute 27% of the population than in a district in which they hold 
14% of seats and constitute 15% of the population (even though parity measure would 
suggest the opposite).  Thus, minorities have an incentive to maximize their level of 
descriptive representation on the board without concern for their population size.   
The primary determinant of minority representation is the size of the minority 
population. There are three possible measures of population size which could 
conceivably be used in this analysis, all of which correlate highly with one another 
(above .97).  The first is the size of the African-American and Latino voting age 
population.  While this is an accurate measure of the electorate, it ignores the fact that 
African-Americans and Latinos are more likely than other groups to have school aged 
children, and therefore underestimates the number of minorities who have a strong 
incentive to vote in school board elections.  The second is the percentage of African-
American and Latino students within a district.  One could argue that the school board 
should reflect the composition of the student body it serves; however, students, by in 
large, are excluded from the electoral process.  Moreover, this measure would inflate the 
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size of the minority population relative to the actual voting age population.  Therefore, I 
chose to use the percentage of African-Americans and Latinos residing within a district.  
This measure, because it includes residents who are not yet eligible to vote, results in a 
number greater than the voting age population, but smaller than student-based measures.  
Lastly, this measure also allows for greater comparability to past research, most of which 
has relied on residential population measures in order to predict levels of minority 
representation on local school boards (see Fraga, Meier, and England 1986; Marschall 
2005; Meier and Stewart 1991b; Robinson and Dye 1978; Robinson and England 1981; 
Welch and Karning 1978; Wright, Hirlinger, and England 1998).  Replicating the 
analysis with the other possible measures of population size produces similar results in 
terms of significance and direction.  The coefficients for African-American/Latino 
population size tend to be smaller when the student-based measure is used (which is 
expected as this measure inflates the size of the population relative to the residential 
measure) and larger when voting-age population is used in place of residential 
population (which is expected as this measure deflates the size of the population relative 
to the residential measure).   
The percentage of African-Americans within a district should be positively 
related to African-American representation on the board.  Similarly, Latino population 
size should determine the share of offices held by Latinos.  In addition to controlling for 
population size, I also account for the percentage of African-Americans/Latinos who 
hold a college degree, as electoral successes also depends upon the socioeconomic 
resources available to each community.   
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Rodriguez (1999) agues that the nature of inter-minority relations varies 
considerably in different geographic locations.  With this in mind, I insert a series of 
regional control variables into each model.  The economic status of the Anglo 
community should also influence the ability of minorities to achieve their desired level 
of representation.  Minorities are thought to benefit from a high degree of Anglo 
poverty, as limited Anglo resources restrict the effectiveness of minority repression and 
place the groups on a more level playing field (Stewart, England, and Meier 1989).  
A long stream of literature analyzes how electoral structure influences minority 
representation. Generally, these studies find that the presence of ward, or single-member 
district, systems facilitate minority representation (Arrington and Watts 1991; Engstrom 
and McDonald 1986; Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004; Meier, Gonzalez-Juenke, 
Wrinkle, and Polinard 2005; Robinson and Dye 1978; Robinson and England 1981).  
Wards boost levels of minority representation because districts are typically drawn along 
racial lines.  This effectively guarantees the election of minorities from certain districts.  
Under at-large arrangements, prospective minority officials must face an electorate that 
is usually predominately Anglo.5  
                                                 
5 Increases in the population size of racial/ethnic minorities, as well as Anglo residential 
patterns, have resulted in creation of several “Majority-Minority” school districts.  In 
MM districts, the influence of electoral structure on levels of minority representation 
may differ considerably from its influence in non-MM districts.  Nonetheless, it is 
important to note that in the average district included in this sample both Latinos and 
African-Americans remain a minority.  The mean percentage of Latinos within a district 
is 13%, while the average for African-Americans is 10%.  Latinos constitute a minority 
in 94% of all districts included in the sample, while African-Americans constitute a 
minority in 97% of all districts.  Nevertheless, dummy variables are used in order to 
control for the effect of majority African-American or Latino districts.   
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A second structural variable which must be considered is the presence of partisan 
elections.  While in most circumstances the presence of partisanship is a given, the focus 
of this present study, school boards, usually has non-partisan elections, making this 
structural variable a probable determinate of representation.  On average, nonpartisan 
systems tend to benefit Anglo business-class candidates (Davidson and Fraga 1988).  
Robinson and Dye (1978) find that levels of African-American representation on school 
boards are modestly increased under partisan systems.  Karning and Welch (1980), 
however, find that partisan elections are associated with a lower number of African-
American candidates in city council elections, although it has little bearing on the actual 
level of African-American representation.  Previous work has also suggested that race-
based voting is facilitated by non-partisan elections (Pomper 1966; Gordon 1970).  In 
the absence of partisanship, race may become an increasingly important cue in 
determining vote choice.  Moreover, partisan identification often competes with racial 
sentiments, leading liberal Anglos, Latinos, and African-Americans to vote for the same 
candidate irrespective of the candidate’s race or ethnicity.  In this vein, Johnson, Farrell, 
and Guinn (1999) argue that nonpartisan elections and weak Democratic Party 
organization have contributed to inter-minority tensions in Los Angles.  In short, distinct 
processes likely underlie the dynamics of inter-minority electoral coalitions under these  
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different arrangements.  Therefore, I spilt the sample and perform separate analyses6 for 
districts that elect their board members through partisan and non-partisan elections in 
order to examine the following hypothesis: 
Rainbow Coalitions will be more likely to form under partisan electoral systems.   
This occurs because there is a structural incentive for liberal minorities to vote 
for the same candidate irrespective of the candidate’s race or ethnicity.  Meanwhile, 
inter-minority competition will be more likely to occur under non-partisan electoral 
systems.  This occurs because individuals are more likely to rely on racial cues which 
are easier to discern than ideological ones.    
Lastly, I control for whether or not a district has a majority African-American or 
Latino population, expecting that minority representation will generally be higher in 
such districts (Henig, Hula, Orr, and Pedescleaux 1999).  I also separate out districts in 
which both the African-American and Latino populations are numerical minorities; 
however, were they to be combined, their population would constitute a numerical 
majority.  These are the districts in which minority populations should have the greatest 
incentive to form rainbow coalitions.  Therefore, I insert a dummy variable for such 
districts and interact it with the African-American and Latino population measures in 
order to search for evidence of inter-minority coalitions in such districts.     
 
                                                 
6 Conducting a Chow Test allows me to reject the null hypothesis that the difference 
between the coefficients in the partisan and non-partisan models is equal to zero.  This 
provides some empirical support for my theoretical contention that distinct processes 
underlie partisan and non-partisan elections.    
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Table 3.1     
Descriptive Statistics     
    
Variable  Mean  
Standard 
Deviation   
    
African-American Population 9.85  13.35 
    
Latino Population 12.99  18.40 
    
Latino Citizen Population 9.49  13.65 
    
Latino Non-Citizen Population 3.49  5.64 
    
% African-Americans who have 15.97  14.14 
Graduated from College     
    
% Latinos who have  14.29  11.94 
Graduated from College     
    
% Anglos Living in Poverty 6.03  3.93 
    
Partisan System (0, 1) 13.82  34.52 
    
 Single-Member District System (0, 1)  27.53  44.68 
    
Majority African-American Population 
(0, 1)  2.15  14.50 
    
Majority Latino Population (0, 1)  6.16  24.05 
    
Combined Majority District (0, 1)  3.39  18.10 
    
Northeast (0, 1)  16.15  36.81 
    
Midwest (0, 1)  21.17  40.87 
    
West (0, 1)  27.39  44.61 
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Findings 
Descriptive statistics for all the variables used in this chapter’s analysis are 
presented in Table 3.1.  Table 3.2 presents a simple model of the determinants of  
African-American and Latino representation on school boards under non-partisan 
systems, and is, to some degree, analogous to Meier and Stewart’s (1991b) treatment of 
this matter.  Theoretically, there is reason to suspect correlation among the residuals in 
the two models presented in Table 3.2.  Indeed, the Breusch-Pagan test shows this to be 
the case (χ2 = 9.709).  Accordingly, Zellner’s (1962) seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) technique is used for estimation. 
As expected, representation on school boards is primarily a function of group 
size.  Here a coefficient of 1 represents equal representation (a one percentage point 
increase in the size of a group’s population is associated with a one percentage point 
increase in that group’s level of representation).  We see that African-Americans are 
nearly equally represented (coefficient=.915), while Latinos appear to be slightly 
underrepresented (coefficient=.671).  Both African-Americans and Latinos also benefit 
from increased levels of Anglo poverty, although Latinos benefit from this more so than 
African-Americans.  As expected, Latino representation is increased by a greater level of 
education within the Latino community, while ward systems appear to have no effect on 
the level of Latino or African-American representation.  The level of American-
American incorporation is generally higher outside of the South.  Latinos generally do 
worse in the Midwest and Northeast.  As one might expect, when African-Americans  
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Table 3.2 
Determinants of African-American and Latino School Board Representation 
 in Non-Partisan Elections  
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimates 
Dependent Variable = Percentage of School Board Members That Are: 
     
Independent Variable: Black SE Latino SE 
     
African-American Population .915** (.028) -.063* (.028) 
     
Latino Population .053* (.026) .671** (.029) 
     
% African-Americans who have -.019 (.019)   
Graduated from College     
     
% Latinos who have   .119** (.025) 
Graduated from College     
     
% Anglos Living in Poverty .217** (.072) .326** (.074) 
     
Single-Member District System .000 (.006) .000 (.006) 
     
Majority African-American Population .096** (.022) .024 (.023) 
     
Majority Latino Population -.011 (.018) .103** (.019) 
     
Combined Majority District -.071 (.087) -.022 (.091) 
     
Combined Majority District X .319^ (.165) .090 (.171) 
African-American Population     
     
Combined Majority District X .092 (.151) -.117 (.157) 
Latino Population     
     
Northeast .014^ (.008) -.019* (.009) 
     
Midwest .020** (.007) -.001 (.007) 
     
West .009 (.007) -.036** (.007) 
     
Constant -.023* (.009) -.055** (.010) 
     
N 1354  1354  
R2 0.692  0.685  
Breusch-Pagan test of independence: χ2 (Probability), 9.709 (.002) 
(standard errors in parentheses) ^p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 
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constitute a majority of the residential population, their level of representation on the 
local school board is increased.  The same holds true for Latinos.   
The results presented in Table 3.2 do not support the contention that a larger 
African-American population will positively influence Latino representation.  Rather, 
the relationship appears to be negative, a result not predicted by either the rainbow 
coalition or the Meier and Stewart (1991b) hypotheses.  The model for African-
American representation further challenges the traditional predictions of the power 
thesis, while seeming to provide some support for the rainbow coalition hypothesis.  An 
increase in the size of the Latino population does modestly increase the level of African-
American representation (coefficient =.053).  These findings stand in contrast to those of 
Meier and Stewart (1991b), who found that African-American group size was positively 
related to Latino representation, while Latino group size was negatively related to 
African-American representation. A few differences are worth noting.  First, Meier and 
Stewart’s (1991b) sample was taken in 1986 and consists of 118 districts, while the 
sample here is of over 1,576 districts.  Also, Meier and Stewart use OLS as their 
estimation technique, where SUR is more appropriate.  More importantly, however, 
Meier and Stewart do not control for the presence of partisan elections.  As this chapter 
will demonstrate, partisanship substantially influences the nature of inter-minority 
coalition building. 
There is also some indication that African-Americans are better able to translate 
their numbers into representation on local school boards in districts where African-
Americans and Latinos constitute a minority of the population but combined make up a 
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majority.  However, there is no evidence of inter-minority cooperation (as noted by the 
relationship between African-American group size and the level of Latino representation 
and vice versa) in such districts.   
As noted earlier, the dynamics of inter-minority relations are unlikely to be static.  
The considerable population growth in the Latino community over the past few years 
may be one of the factors underlying the inconsistency of these findings with previous 
research.  As the alternative version of the power thesis presented earlier suggests, 
Latino immigration may alter the dynamics of coalitional relationships, reversing the 
assumption that Anglos and Latinos are more natural coalition partners than Anglos and 
African-Americans.  In order to examine this possibility, I replicate the findings 
presented in Table 3.2, replacing the variable which takes account of the percentage of 
Latinos within a district with two variables which measure the percentage of the school 
district population that is comprised of Latino citizens and Latino non-citizens.7 The 
positive relationship between Latino population size and African-American 
representation may be the result of either Latino support for African-American 
candidates, or the increased likelihood of Anglos to support African-American 
candidates in areas with large Latino populations (the former is the hypothesized 
relationship which lies at the heart of the rainbow coalition hypothesis).  If the positive 
relationship between Latino group size and African-American representation is the result 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that these variables correlate at .78, as Latino immigrants tend to 
settle in areas that are already heavily populated by Latino citizens.  
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of Latino attempts to form rainbow coalitions, then we would expect the relationship 
between Latino citizens and African-American representation to remain positive.  For 
obvious reasons, a positive relationship between the percentage of Latino non-citizens 
within a district and African-American representation cannot be the result of electoral 
support for African-American candidates on the part of Latino non-citizens.  Rather, 
such a relationship would be indicative of Anglo support for African-American 
candidates, possibly as a result of increased social distance between the Anglo and 
Latino communities.  
The results presented in Table 3.3 indicate that there is no relationship between 
the size of the Latino citizen population and the level of African-American 
representation (p value=.868).  However, in line with the alternative power thesis, the 
greater the percentage of Latino non-citizens within a district, the greater the level of 
African-American representation.  The coefficient (.233) is also substantively 
meaningful and considerably larger than the coefficient for the relationship between the 
size of the Latino population and African-American representation presented in Table 
3.2 (.053).  As a side note, the under-representation of Latinos noted in Table 3.2 is 
lessened when controlling for citizenship.8  
A considerably different portrait of inter-minority relations emerges in districts 
where one would expect to find rainbow coalitions (non Anglo-majority districts).  In 
such districts, the size of the Latino citizen population does inflate the level of African-
                                                 
8 The coefficient for the relationship between the size of the Latino citizen population 
and Latino representation is .844, where a coefficient of 1 would indicate proportional 
representation.    
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American representation on local boards.  Moreover, the presence of a Latino non-
citizen population does not increase African-American representation as it does in other 
districts.  Rather, the relationship here is negative, which is expected given that non-
citizens cannot become members of an electoral coalition.  Yet, there is no evidence that 
Latinos systematically benefit from such cooperative behavior in this analysis.   
 
 
Table 3.3 
Determinants of African-American and Latino School Board Representation  
in Non-Partisan Elections: The Role of Latino Citizenship   
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimates 
Dependent Variable = Percentage of School Board Members That Are: 
     
Independent Variable: Black SE Latino  SE 
     
African-American Population .910** (0.028) -0.041 (0.028) 
     
Latino Citizen Population -0.006 (0.035) .844** (0.037) 
     
Latino Non-Citizen Population .233** (0.077) -0.118 (0.079) 
     
% African-Americans who have -0.017 (0.019)   
Graduated from College      
     
% Latinos who have    .108** (0.025) 
Graduated from College      
     
% Anglos Living in Poverty .234** (0.071) .288** (0.073) 
     
 Single-Member District System -0.001 (0.006) -0.003 (0.006) 
     
Majority African-American Population  .097** (0.022) 0.019 (0.022) 
     
Majority Latino Population  -0.015 (0.018) .115** (0.019) 
     
Combined Majority District  -.198* (0.096) -0.115 (0.098) 
     
Combined Majority District X .565** (0.181) 0.252 (0.185) 
African-American Population     
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Table 3.3 (Continued) 
Determinants of African-American and Latino School Board Representation  
in Non-Partisan Elections: The Role of Latino Citizenship   
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimates 
Dependent Variable = Percentage of School Board Members That Are: 
     
Independent Variable: Black SE Latino  SE 
     
Combined Majority District X .678** (0.226) 0.103 (0.232) 
Latino Citizen Population     
     
Combined Majority District X -.619** (0.237) 0.014 (0.243) 
Latino Non-Citizen Population     
     
Northeast  .015^ (0.008) -.019* (0.009) 
     
Midwest  .019** (0.007) 0.002 (0.007) 
     
West 0.008 (0.007) -.030** (0.007) 
     
Constant  -.024** (0.009) -.053** (0.01) 
     
N 1354  1354  
R2 0.695  0.698  
Breusch-Pagan test of independence: χ2 (Probability), 8.351 (.004) 
(standard errors in parentheses) ^p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 
 
 
Finally, I noted earlier that previous work has emphasized the role of partisanship 
on race-based voting, arguing that partisan elections make it more difficult for 
individuals to make strictly race-based decisions.  Tables 3.4 and 3.5 replicate the 
previous analysis for districts that elect their members through partisan elections.  The 
Breusch-Pagan tests for both sets of equations indicate that correlated errors are not an 
issue, thus OLS is used in place of SUR.  The models in Table 3.4 indicate that Latino 
representation is not affected by the presence of African-Americans within a district.  
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Table 3.4  
Determinants of African-American and Latino School Board Representation in Partisan Elections 
OLS Estimates  
Dependent Variable = Percentage of School Board Members That Are: 
     
Independent Variable: Black  SE Latino  SE 
     
African-American Population 1.049** (.063) -.071 (.049) 
     
Latino Population .268** (.082) .878** (.067) 
     
% African-Americans who have -.001 (.066)   
Graduated from College      
     
% Latinos who have    .115* (.046) 
Graduated from College      
     
% Anglos Living in Poverty .323^ (.182) .285* (.145) 
     
 Single-Member District System .003 (.014) .017 (.011) 
     
Majority African-American Population  -.062 (.049) .037 (.039) 
     
Majority Latino Population  -.182** (.064) -.020 (.051) 
     
Northeast  .049** (.017) -.013 (.013) 
     
Midwest  .057* (.026) .000 (.021) 
     
West -.013 (.032) -.037 (.025) 
     
Constant  -.076** (.025) -.060** (.019) 
     
N 221  222  
R2 0.720  0.750  
(standard errors in parentheses) ^p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 
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Table 3.5  
Determinants of African-American and Latino School Board Representation in Partisan Elections: 
The Role of Latino Citizenship   
OLS Estimates  
Dependent Variable = Percentage of School Board Members That Are: 
     
Independent Variable: Black SE Latino  SE 
     
African-American Population 1.047** (.063) -.039 (.039) 
     
Latino Citizen Population .237* (.096) 1.212** (.062) 
     
Latino Non-Citizen Population .437 (.286) -1.036** (.183) 
     
% African-Americans who have .003 (.067)   
Graduated from College      
     
% Latinos who have    .073* (.037) 
Graduated from College      
     
% Anglos Living in Poverty .345^ (.186) .034 (.118) 
     
 Single-Member District System .003 (.014) .014 (.009) 
     
Majority African-American Population  -.061 (.049) .020 (.032) 
     
Majority Latino Population  -.196** (.068) .141** (.044) 
     
Northeast  .051** (.017) -.028** (.010) 
     
Midwest  .057* (.026) .001 (.017) 
     
West -.018 (.033) .019 (.021) 
     
Constant  -.080** (.025) -.023 (.016) 
     
N 221  222  
R2 0.720  0.840  
(standard errors in parentheses) ^p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 
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However, there remains a positive relationship between the size of the Latino 
population and the level of African-American representation.  Taking Latino citizenship 
into account does change this dynamic, but in a manner opposite to non-partisan 
systems.  That is, there is a significant and positive relationship between the size of the 
Latino citizen population and the level of African-American representation, while the 
size of the Latino non-citizen population appears to have no effect in partisan systems.  
The effect of a one percentage point increase in the Latino citizen population benefits 
African-Americans only slightly less than a one point increase in the percentage of 
Anglos living in poverty.  This finding would appear to provide some support for the 
hypothesis that cooperative electoral behavior between minorities is most likely to occur 
under partisan systems.   
Attempts were made to examine how coalitional relationships varied in districts 
where rainbow coalitions made the most strategic sense, but only three districts in the 
sample employ partisan election systems and meet the “individually a minority, 
combined a majority” criteria used to identify such districts.  Nonetheless, the analysis 
does indicate that inter-minority competition (that is, the formation of either Anglo-
Latino or Anglo-black coalitions) does not appear to materialize in partisan systems as it 
does in non-partisan systems.  This does not mean that rainbow coalitions routinely form 
in such circumstances.  However, there is modest evidence for such coalitions in the 
analyses presented here.  It seems that the presence of partisan elections limits 
competition and may occasionally produce cooperation.   
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Conclusion 
 The dynamics of inter-minority relations are unquestionably complicated.  
Despite commonly held beliefs about the ideological similarity between racial and ethnic 
minorities, the development of long-lasting rainbow coalitions is considered to be 
unlikely in most local settings.  Like many previous works (i.e. McClain 1993; McClain 
and Karnig 1990; Meier and Stewart 1991b; Kaufmann 2003, 2004), the evidence 
presented here does not support the contention that rainbow coalitions routinely form in 
urban areas.  However, the data point to different patterns of conflict than those 
suggested by earlier studies.  Contrary to the predictions of Meier and Stewart’s power 
thesis, there is little support for the notion that Anglo-Latino coalitions are an expected 
substitute for inter-minority ones.  Rather, Latino immigration may encourage the 
development of Anglo-black coalitions, as seen by the increased likelihood of African-
Americans to be elected to local boards in districts with a large Latino non-citizen 
population.   
As with most studies which do not focus on individual attitudes or behavior, 
relationships between population size and representation are interpreted as being 
indicative of cooperation or conflict.  Ultimately, such findings are best considered 
alongside other works that unveil the nuance of inter-minority relations by relying on 
individual-level data, focus groups, or in-depth case studies of select urban areas.  
Sidney (2002), for example, uses discourse analysis to argue that African-Americans and 
Latinos do not agree on the way in which issues related to race permeate the education 
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policymaking process.  “If alliances do emerge,” she warns, “they may be fragile ones 
(276).”  
Despite such skepticism, this study does suggest one mechanism that can work to 
increase the likelihood that minorities will form cooperative electoral relationships, the 
adoption of a partisan electoral system.  Non-partisan systems originally gained 
popularity during the progressive movement as a way to depoliticize the education 
policymaking process.  Instead, non-partisan elections redistribute electoral advantages 
and incentives for coalition building away from some groups and towards others.  
Minority representation tends to be higher under partisan systems, with minorities, on 
average, being slightly overrepresented given their population size (although this is only 
true for Latinos if you discount the non-citizen population).  Moreover, African-
American representation on local boards also increases with the size of the Latino citizen 
population under partisan systems.  Such benefits, however, remain confined to the 
relatively small number of districts (approximately 14%) that use such systems.  
 This study also indicates that African-Americans benefit from the presence of a 
large Latino population in districts where no individual racial/ethnic group comprises a 
majority of the population but the combined racial/ethnic minority population does.  
However, only 3% of all districts meet this demographic criterion, so that in the vast 
majority of school districts within the United States, competition, not cooperation, 
remains the norm.  It is essential that future research pay attention to varying structural 
and demographic contexts in order to better understand what factors are responsible for 
the formation of different governing coalitions in urban areas across the United States.  
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CHAPTER IV 
AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION OF 
LATINOS ON LOCAL SCHOOL BOARDS 
The present-day political life of racial/ethnic minorities within the United States 
is the product of a long history of overt and clandestine discrimination. This history, and 
the social attitudes which stem from it, not only complicates the political relationships 
between minorities and Anglos, but also between African-Americans and Latinos.  As a 
result, inter-minority “cooperation” seems to be a relatively rare occurrence.  The 
resulting norm of political “conflict” impacts multiple policy arenas, especially 
education.  Anecdotal evidence, as we have seen, suggests that African-American – 
Latino relations are exceptionally tenuous within the educational policy arena (Vaca 
2004).  Moreover, several scholars have put forth the argument that education is a 
specific cause of tension between the communities in recent years (see de la Garza 
1997). The previous chapter provides empirical support for the contention that minority 
groups seldom come together to form mass-level coalitions in school board elections.  
Of course, studies which focus on mass-level data have limitations, especially for 
researchers concerned with public policy outcomes. Such studies are popular for a 
variety of reasons, including the advancement of academic theory but also the relatively 
easy access to data on this topic.  As a result, we know much more about questions 
relating to African-American - Latino relations at the mass level than we do at the elite 
level.  A brief survey of recent academic journal articles within political science will turn 
up multiple articles posing research questions analogous to “Do Black and Latino racial 
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attitudes and policy preferences differ when the members of the other groups live 
nearby,” (Oliver and Wong 2003; Stein, Post, and Rinden 2000) “Do Black or Latino 
voters support or challenge legislation or initiatives hostile to the other group,” (Morris 
2000; Tolbert and Hero 1996) and “Do Latino and Black voters support candidates from 
the other group, and if so, under what circumstances?”  
  But what about elected public elites?  Should we expect the evidence at the mass 
level to be consistent for elite behavior?  There are several reasons to suspect that the 
political relationships between African-Americans and Latinos should be very different 
at the elite level.  First, the high levels of education, experience, and financial resources 
required for winning political office may contribute to different responses to competition 
from other minority groups (Tedin and Murray 1994).  Secondly, political elites operate 
under different constraints than non-elites.  The nature of representation under different 
electoral rules substantially influences the behavior of elites, and indeed in ways that 
may differ from their true preferences.  Finally, the size of the impact an individual elite 
and non-elite can have in their respective contexts should shape their preferences and 
behavior differently (the collective action problem differs for elites and non-elites).   
For these reasons, this chapter moves beyond an examination of mass-level 
behavior.  The focus here is no longer on what kind of electoral coalitions African-
Americans and Latinos opt for, but what kind of relationships develop at the elite level, 
specifically among elected officials.  Within the realm of education policy, this means 
elected school board members who oversee the operation of the vast majority of public 
schools within the United States.  While a study of African-American and Latino 
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legislative cooperation on local school boards provides obvious leverage on questions 
concerning race relations within the education system, it may also afford a large degree 
of generalizability towards other elite groups.  After all, as of 2000 nearly 21% of all 
African-American elected officials served of school boards (Joint Center 2000). 
Meanwhile, a plurality of Latino elected officials, 42%, held such positions (NALEO 
2000).  Thus, an examination of the relationships between African-Americans and 
Latinos serving on local school boards speaks not only to the primary political actors 
within the education policymaking process, but also to the behavior of a large number of 
minority politicians generally.  This chapter begins by reviewing what we know about 
how minorities are substantively represented within legislative bodies, with an emphasis 
on substantive representation within local legislative bodies.  Drawing on insights from 
studies focusing on inter-minority cooperation and conflict in local politics, I then 
consider what the implications of minority representation for other minority groups 
might be.  The hypotheses which I draw out of this literature are tested using data 
provided from the National Latino Education Study.  
Minority Representation in Local Government 
Since Hanna Pitkin (1967) first developed the descriptive, symbolic, and 
substantive representation framework, several scholars have studied the 
interrelationships between these various types of representation. One result has been a 
plethora of studies concluding that descriptive representation usually leads to substantive 
representation within legislative bodies (e.g. Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Hero 
and Tolbert 1995; Meier and England 1984; Owens 2005; Karnig and Welch 1981). 
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While several of these studies focus on the U.S. Congress, others have established this 
link within local legislative bodies, such as city councils and school boards (see 
Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Marschall 2005; Meier and England 1984; Meier, 
Gonzalez-Juenke, Wrinkle, and Polinard 2005; Mladenka 1989b; Polinard, Wrinkle, 
Longoria, and Binder 1994; Robinson and Dye 1978; Robinson and England 1981).  
Few studies, however, have extended this literature by examining the implication 
of minority representation for other minority groups.  To some degree, this lack of 
scholarly attention can be explained by the dominant way substantive representation has 
been conceptualized.  When viewed primarily as policy congruence between 
representatives and their constituencies, the liberal ideological disposition and 
Democratic Party affiliation of most African-Americans and Latinos tends to result in 
similar voting patterns, especially within U.S. Congress (Lublin 1997).   Yet, students of 
representation have long thought of representation in numerous ways beyond policy 
congruence.  Eulau and Karps (1977), for example, add three alternative 
conceptualizations: service responsiveness, allocative responsiveness, and symbolism.9  
Scholars, unfortunately, have paid little consideration to how to best think of 
substantive representation at different levels of government.  Lower levels of 
government are more likely to face issues which could be considered pragmatic and may 
                                                 
9 Eulau and Karps (1977, 241) define these alternative conceptualizations in the 
following manner: “There is service responsiveness which involves the efforts of the 
representative to secure particularized benefits for individuals or groups in his 
constituency.  There is allocation responsiveness which refers to the representative’s 
efforts to obtain benefits for his constituency through pork-barrel exchanges in the 
appropriations process or through administrative inventions.  Finally, there is what we 
shall call symbolic responsiveness which involves public gestures of a sort that create a 
sense of trust and support in the relationship between representative and represented.  
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not easily be placed on an ideological dimension (Straayer, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1998).  
This is compounded within the education system, where nonpartisan governance makes 
it more difficult for school board members to form voting blocs which are rooted in 
ideology.  In such settings, a complete understanding of substantive representation must 
consider not only voting patterns, as most studies of representation in U.S. Congress or 
state legislatures do, but alternative conceptualizations of substantive representation, 
such as those presented by Eulau and Karps (1977). 
Alternative conceptualizations also carry with them different implications 
relating to African-American and Latino cooperation and conflict.  Whereas both 
African-Americans and Latinos typically stand to benefit from redistributive policies, 
service responsiveness is more likely to occur within a strict zero-sum context, with 
particularized benefits for African-Americans limiting the benefits which Latinos are 
able to receive and vice versa.  Not surprisingly, such scarcity has been found to foster 
inter-minority competition over beneficial resources.   
Studies which have found that socioeconomic indicators across racial/ethnic 
groups positively covary argue that this occurs because income and education, while not 
limitless, do not occur within a zero-sum context (see McClain and Tauber 2001, Meier 
et al. 2004).  Political empowerment variables, such as representation on city councils, 
are more likely to negatively covary because they do exist within a zero-sum context, 
where increased representation on the part of one group makes it more difficult for other 
groups to achieve representation.  
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Within the field of urban politics, one popular measure of the substantive 
representation of racial/ethnic minorities has been the percentage of municipal 
employees belonging to such groups.  A long stream of literature concludes that as 
minority political power increases so does the share of public jobs held by minorities 
(Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Campbell and Feagin 1975; Chandler and Gely 
1995; Dye and Renick 1981; Eisinger 1982a, 1982b; Kerr and Mladenka 1994; 
Mladenka 1989a, 1989b; Polinard et al. 1994; Saltzstein 1989; Stein 1986).  Generally, 
these studies find that while minority population size is the primary determinant of 
public employment, politics does play a critical role.  This occurs mainly through 
minority representation on city council seats, with control of the mayoral office being a 
less consistent predictor of employment (see Kerr and Mladenka 1994; Mladenka 
1989a).  Similar relationships also occur within school districts, where minority 
representation on school boards consistently has been found to be related to more 
minority administrators and teachers (Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Meier and 
Stewart 1991b; Wright, Hirlinger, and England 1998).  Saltzstein (1986) has even 
extended this hypothesis to search for evidence of substantive representation among 
females, finding that female political empowerment is positively related to female 
employment in non-clerical and administrative positions.  Together, these studies 
suggest that municipal employment is an extremely useful area of investigation for 
representation scholars.  
Using the Eulau and Karps (1977, 241) framework, public employee hires can be 
understood as form of service responsiveness, in that such hires illustrate “efforts by 
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representatives to secure particularized benefits for individuals or groups in his 
constituency.”  That is, the urban politics literature argues that minority politicians seek 
to promote the increased hiring of minority workers specifically because minority 
employment is seen as a way to promote the economic advancement of minority groups.  
In the words of Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984, 169), “governmental employment 
has long been an important goal and point of early access for excluded groups in 
American society, most recently for blacks and Hispanics.”   
Additionally, such hires can be considered symbolic in nature, fitting Eulau and 
Karps’ definition of “public gestures of a sort that create a sense of trust and support.”  
This is especially true for certain employment sectors, such as police departments.  
Lastly, it may be accurate to view public employee hires as a proxy for policy 
responsiveness, bearing in mind that descriptive representation within public 
organizations has been shown to positively influence policy outcomes for minority 
groups through variety of direct and indirect means (Hindera 1993a, 1993b; Meier, 
Stewart, and England, 1989; Polinard, Wrinkle, and Longoria 1989; Meier 1993; Selden 
1997; Selden, Brudney, and Kellough 1998).  
In a previous study, McClain (1993) considers the relationship between African-
American and Latino municipal employment. Although employment in such positions is, 
to some degree, a zero-sum situation, McClain (1993) finds no relationship between 
African-American and Latino employment. As with political offices, when both groups 
make gains, they tend to do so at the expense of Anglos. McClain’s study, however, does 
not consider how minority political representation affects the municipal employment of 
67  
other minority groups, so no conclusions can be drawn regarding African-American and 
Latino legislative cooperation at the local level.  
This chapter takes up this question. More succinctly, are the positive affects of 
African-American representation strengthened, weakened, or unaffected by the presence 
of Latino representation? Conversely, are the positive affects of Latino representation 
strengthened, weakened, or unaffected by the presence of African-American 
representation? Examining these questions also makes an important advancement 
beyond the simple covariance models used in other works and allows for more definitive 
statements regarding causality. They also allow for an examination of minority-minority 
relations within the local legislative process, rather than in terms of political inputs or 
outputs.  
Modeling African-American and Latino Access to Administrative and Teaching 
Positions  
Once again, the National Latino Education Study offers unique leverage on this 
question.  The NLES falls just shy on capturing the universe of urban school districts 
within the United States, and therefore also offers a nearly complete sample of 
multiracial school districts as well.  The general hypotheses outlined above require that 
school districts not only be diverse in terms of the composition of their population, but 
also in terms of their school board membership.  In other words, the hypotheses argue 
that the ability of racial/ethnic minorities to translate descriptive representation on school 
boards into some form of substantive representation may be contingent upon the 
presence of other minorities on the board.   
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Descriptive representation is measured in a relatively straightforward manner, by 
taking account of the percentage of school board seats held by each group.  Considering 
the contingent nature of the hypotheses, this measure is interacted with a simply dummy 
variable, coded “1” if both African-Americans and Latinos serve on the school board, 
“0” otherwise.  Within the NLES there are 113 districts which meet this criterion.   
Measuring substantive representation, of course, presents a much greater 
challenge.  As mentioned above, one popular measure within the urban politics literature 
has been the percentage of municipal employees belonging to some group.  Within the 
educational system, the analogous measure is the percentage of administrators.  As with 
municipal employees, operationalizing the substantive representation of racial/ethnic 
minorities as the percentage of minority administrators and teachers fits several facets of 
Eulau and Karps’ (1977) framework, including service responsiveness and symbolism.  
Within education there is a long stream of literature arguing that increased descriptive 
representation among administrators and teachers will positively affect student 
outcomes, defined both in terms of academic performance and lower levels of “second-
generation discrimination” (Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Meier and Stewart 
1991b; Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999; Wright, Hirlinger, and England 1998).10  
Thus, the argument that such a measure may also be seen as a form of policy 
responsiveness is applicable within education.  Lastly, there is also a large degree of 
substantive importance attached to minority employment within the public education 
system.  Just as Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984, 169) emphasize the importance of 
                                                 
10 This is an area which will be examined more in-depth in Chapter V.  
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minority municipal employment as a “point of early access for excluded groups in 
American society,” so too has employment within public schools been instrumental in 
establishing a middle class within minority communities. 
 Beyond political explanations of minority employment, the most influential 
variables determining the percentage of minority administrators should be the size of the 
available labor pool.  This is accounted for by controlling for the percentage of 
population comprised of African-Americans/Latinos.  Employment within the 
educational system also requires a college degree, so I control for the percentage of 
African-Americans/Latinos who possess at least a bachelor’s degree.  The same 
variables should determine the percentage of African-American/Latino teachers within a 
district; however, representation among teaching faculties may also be a function of the 
presence of co-ethnics within the administrators.  With this in mind, I account for the 
percentage of African-American/Latino administrators when predicting the percentage 
of African-American/Latino teachers within a district.  As a final control, I insert a 
dummy variable for those districts in which African-Americans or Latinos control a 
majority of seats on the board.  
Findings  
Table 4.1 presents the results for the first series of models, which attempt to 
determine what influences the percentage of African-American and Latino 
administrators within a district.  The findings indicate that for each point increase in the 
percentage of the African-American population, African-American representation 
among school administrators increases .759.  In line with the expectation that  
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Table 4.1 
Cooperation and Conflict in the Hiring of Minority Administrators 
OLS Estimates 
Dependent Variable = Percentage of School Administrators That Are: 
     
Independent Variable: Black SE Latino SE 
     
Black Population .759** (0.042)   
     
Latino Population   .333** (0.023) 
     
% Blacks who have a College Degree  .018* (0.009)   
     
% Latinos who have a College Degree    .045** (0.009) 
     
% Black School Board Members .172** (0.036)   
     
% Latino School Board Members   .345** (0.053) 
     
Blacks and Latinos on the Board (0,1) 1.100 (1.720) 0.669 (1.999) 
     
% Black School Board Members "X" -0.018 (0.083)   
Blacks and Latinos on the Board     
     
% Latino School Board Members "X"   -.205* (0.101) 
Blacks and Latinos on the Board     
     
Majority Black Board 7.087* (3.063)   
     
Majority Latino Board    6.572 (4.243) 
     
Constant -0.019 (0.309) -1.708** (0.276) 
     
N 1361  1372  
R2 0.79  0.83  
^p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 
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employment is a function of the available labor pool, there is also a boost as the 
percentage African-Americans holding a college degree increases.   
African-American employment is also increased by political representation, 
where capturing an additional seat on a seven member board appears to increase the 
percentage of African-American administrators by 2.4 percent.  There appears to be no 
evidence, however, that the ability of African-Americans to translate descriptive 
representation on school boards into substantive representation is in any way affected by 
the presence of Latinos on the board.   
For Latinos, population numbers appear to matter less.  The percentage of school 
administrators who are Latino increases by .333 with each additional point increase in 
the percentage of the Latino population (where the analogous coefficient for African-
Americans is .759).  However, Latinos do profit from a higher level of college 
education, indicating that market forces are important for both communities.  The 
finding that Latino administrative employment increases at a higher rate with college 
education than it does for African-Americans (coefficient of .045 for Latinos, compared 
to .018 for African-Americans) is a possible indicator that Latino access to government 
employment is more influenced by the characteristics of that community.   
Latinos appear to benefit just as much from political office holding as they do 
from their population size, a sharp contrast from African-Americans where population 
numbers seem have a much larger influence on employment than office holding.  Also 
conflicting with the model for African-Americans, we do find that the positive 
relationship between Latino representation on school boards and Latino representation 
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among school administrators is contingent upon the presence of African-Americans on 
the board.   
The findings here point towards inter-minority competition within the legislative 
arena of the educational policymaking process, with the positive effect of Latino 
representation being diminished on boards where African-Americans are likewise 
represented.  This effect is also substantively meaningful.  In order to illustrate this, 
Figure 4.1 plots the slope for the relationship between Latino board membership and the  
percentage of Latino administrators for both possible conditions (serving with or without 
African-Americans), holding all other variables at their mean or modal categories.   
 
 
Figure 4.1  
The Effect of Black Political Representation on the Relationship between Latino 
Board Members and Latino Administrators  
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Let us consider a hypothetical seven member board on which Latinos hold two 
seats (or approximately 28% of the seats).  If Latinos do not have to compete with 
African-American representatives, they can expect to get a boost just shy of 10 
percentage points (9.7) in their share of administrative positions.  On boards in which 
there are African-American representatives to compete with, Latinos can expect a much 
more modest boost of 4.6 percentage points, even when controlling for the main effect 
which indicates that the percentage of Latino administrators tends to be slightly higher 
within districts in which both groups serve on the board.   
Table 4.2 presents the results for a second series of models in order to determine 
whether school board representation has an effect on the hiring on minority teachers, as 
it does on minority administrators.  Unlike the models presented in Table 4.1, the 
Breusch-Pagan test (χ2= 4.782, p= .029) reveals that the models for African-Americans 
and Latinos suffer from correlation among the residuals, necessitating the use of 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions.    
As with administrators, African-American representation among teachers 
increases with the size of the African-American population; although, unlike the models 
for administrators, the level of education within the African-American community does 
not have an effect.  African-American employment among teachers is also increased by 
political representation.  However, the greatest impact on descriptive representation 
among teachers appears to be the presence of African-American administrators, with a 
one percentage point increase in the number of African-American administrators 
associated with just under a .5 percentage point increase in the number of African- 
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Table 4.2 
Cooperation and Conflict in the Hiring of Minority Teachers 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimates 
Dependent Variable = Percentage of School Teacher That Are: 
     
Independent Variable: Black SE Latino SE 
     
Black Population 0.276** (0.019)   
     
Latino Population   0.190** (0.012) 
     
% Blacks who have a College Degree  -0.005 (0.008)   
     
% Latinos who have a College Degree    0.024* (0.010) 
     
% Black School Administrators 0.498** (0.016)   
     
% Latino School Administrators   0.515** (0.020) 
     
% Black School Board Members 0.057** (0.014)   
     
% Latino School Board Members   0.103** (0.018) 
     
Blacks and Latinos on the Board (0,1) -1.079 (0.814) 0.754 (0.788) 
     
% Black School Board Members "X" 0.032 (0.029)   
Blacks and Latinos on the Board     
     
% Latino School Board Members "X"   -0.133** (0.028) 
Blacks and Latinos on the Board     
     
Majority Black Board 7.455** (0.991)   
     
Majority Latino Board    0.140 (1.165) 
     
Constant -0.563** (0.216) -0.723 (0.229) 
     
N 1353  1353  
R2 0.87  0.88  
Breusch-Pagan test of independence: χ2 (Probability), 4.782 (.029) ^p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 
 
75  
American teachers.  As with Table 4.1, there is no evidence that the ability of African-
Americans to translate political representation into increased employment within the 
educational system is affected by the presence of Latinos on the board.   
Latino representation among teachers likewise increases with the size of the 
Latino population, although, like the models for minority administrators, Latinos appear 
to be benefit from population size to a smaller degree than African-Americans.  Latino 
education, measured as the percentage of Latinos holding a college degree, is also a 
significant predictor of Latino teachers.  Once again, the presence of co-ethnics in 
administrative positions has a greatest substantive impact.  The size of the benefit which 
Latinos extract from passive representation among administrators is analogous to that 
which African-Americans extract (coefficients =.515 and .498 respectively).  
Additionally, Latinos receive a direct benefit from having co-ethnics on the school 
board, but, as with administrators, the findings also point towards inter-minority 
competition within the legislative arena of the educational policymaking process 
The positive influence of Latino school board members is drastically reduced in 
districts where African-Americans serve on the board (coefficient for the interactive 
term= -.133, compared to .103 for the main effect).  Thus, when it comes to the hiring of 
both administrators and teachers, we see that Latinos are far less able to translate 
political gains into employment in districts where they serve on boards alongside 
African-Americans.   
While these findings contribute to the existing literature on minority 
representation by establishing a pattern of inter-minority competition, a larger question 
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remains: Why do minorities compete on local school boards?  More specifically, why do 
these results seem to indicate that the ability of Latinos to turn descriptive representation 
into substantive representation is hampered on multi-minority school boards while 
African-Americans appear to be unaffected on such boards?  In the next section, I turn 
my attention to one possible explanation suggested, although never empirically tested, 
by other scholars: Latino population growth.  
Latino Population Growth as an Explanation of Inter-Minority Competition within 
the Local Legislative Arena  
As mentioned in the first chapter, Rudy de la Garza (1997) cites education as one 
of the four prime causes of tension between African-Americans and Latinos over the 
past several years.  In particular, de la Garza (1997) points towards Latino population 
growth and the resulting pressure on school districts to hire more Latino administrators.  
Such positions exist within a “soft” zero-sum context in that districts do have the ability 
to create additional slots, however the limited resources available to districts often 
seriously constrains their ability to do so.  If districts are unable to respond to Latino 
population growth by creating additional administrative positions then increasing 
Latinos’ share of administrative positions will mean lowering the share for other groups, 
including African-Americans.  The argument presented here is simple; Latinos will find 
themselves less able to translate their descriptive representation on school boards into 
substantive representation (conceived of as the hiring of Latino school administrators) in 
districts which are characterized by higher rates of Latino population growth.  
77  
There are a variety of reasons, beyond the zero-sum context, which might lead 
scholars to suspect that such a relationship exists.  Perhaps the most obvious of these is a 
derivation of the “racial threat” hypothesis.  In its simplest form, the racial threat 
hypothesis argues that the racial attitudes of Anglos tend to be more hostile in 
communities with large minority populations (Blalock 1967; Giles 1977).  In this vein, 
several studies have established that there is a negative relationship between minority 
group size and the racial attitudes of Anglos (Giles 1977; Giles and Bunker 1993; Glaser 
1994; Tolbert and Grummel 2003).  In a more recent study, Cain, Citrin, and Wong 
(2000) expand the hypothesis beyond Anglo attitudes, finding that Latinos tend to 
respond to large African-American populations by developing stronger racial/ethnic 
identities.  Such findings should not be unexpected considering other work notes the 
relatively high degree of economic competition between Latinos and African-Americans 
(Waldinger 2001).  Economic competition, then, may explain why feelings of threat are 
generalizable beyond Anglos, as large Latino populations may limit African-American 
opportunities within an area and vice versa.  
However, minority group size is only one mechanism by which threat can occur.  
Unlike African-Americans, whose population numbers have stayed relatively constant 
over the past several decades, the Latino community has been characterized by 
extremely high rates of growth within recent years.  Indeed, the average school district 
within the United States witnessed a growth of 3.7 percentage points between 1990 and 
2000.  One argument which may be posed is that an increase in the size of the minority 
population, not simply their preexistent numbers, works to cause feelings of threat.  In 
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other words, a group which increases in size from 10% to 20% is more likely to produce 
feelings of threat in others than a group whose population has remained constant at 21%.  
This line of reasoning assumes that groups are most likely to feel that their social and 
economic privilege is threatened not when confronted with other groups who possesss 
ubstantial (numerical) resources, but rather when confronted with other groups who 
enjoy increasingly greater resources.11   
This logic can also be extended beyond racial attitudes.  Giles and Hertz (1994) 
argues that threat affects other forms of political behavior, specifically partisan 
identification.  Oliver (2001) even notes that individuals residing in communities with 
greater levels of racial/ethnic heterogeneity are more likely to contact officials and 
attend community board meetings (however, see Leighley and Vedlitz (1999) who find 
that minority group size has a depressive effect on Anglo political participation).  Lastly, 
Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran (1996) find that members of Congress are less likely 
to substantively represent African-Americans when the African-American population 
shifts from 15 to 25%.  At smaller numbers, representatives are able to substantively 
represent African-American constituents without worry of electoral reprisal on the part 
of non-blacks.  At higher levels, however, the representative’s fear of alienating non-
blacks works to discourage the substantive representation of African-Americans.  
                                                 
11 Similar arguments can be found in comparative politics, where scholars such as 
Lijphart (1977) and Dahl (1971) have long noted that increases in the number of ethnic 
groups often tests the stability of democratic governments. As Dahl (1971, 108) writes, 
“that subcultural pluralism often places a dangerous strain on the tolerance and mutual 
security required for a system of public contestation seems hardly open to doubt.”   
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If this literature is correct, then presumably the growth within the Latino 
population should likewise have consequences beyond the formation of racial attitudes.  
The question presented here, then, is whether Latino population growth has affected not 
only racial attitudes but the nature of Latino representation within local legislative 
bodies.  In narrower terms, I am attempting to discern whether Latinos are less able to 
translate their descriptive representation on local school boards into substantive 
representation in districts which have been characterized by higher rates of Latino 
population growth. 
 In order to test this hypothesis, I replicate the model presented in Table 4.1.  
However, rather than interacting the measure of Latino descriptive representation with a 
dummy variable indicating whether or not African-Americans serve on the board as 
well, I interact it with a measure of Latino population growth.  This measure is 
calculated by subtracting the Latino population in 1990 from the Latino population in 
2000 for each school district included in the NLES.  Correspondingly, I also control for 
whether Latino population growth has a direct effect on the percentage of Latino 
administrators.   
Before turning to the results, one should note that districts in which African-
Americans and Latinos serve on the school board simultaneously are also characterized 
by extremely high rates of Latino population growth, see Table 4.3.  As mentioned 
earlier, the average district saw the Latino population rise by 3.7 percentage points 
between 1990 and 2000, with the average Latino population being 13% by 2000.  Within 
the 113 school districts in which African-Americans and Latinos both serve on the 
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board, Latino population growth was 7.8 percentage points.  This compares to a rate of 
growth of 3.4 percentage points in all other districts.  This difference is statistically 
significant.  Thus, not only do we have potentially rivaling explanations of Latino 
administrative employment, but explanations which suffer from a considerable degree of 
empirical overlap.  
 
 
Table 4.3 
Mean Latino Population Growth (as a Percent of the Total Population)  
 
Districts with both Latinos and 
Blacks on the School Board  
 
7.8 
All Other Districts  3.4 
 
Difference of Means Test,  t score = -9.999 
 
 All Districts  3.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4 presents the results for the model which accounts for Latino population 
growth.  The R2 for this model (.854) is modestly higher than the R2 for the model 
presented in Table 4.1 (.825), indicating that controlling for Latino population growth 
explains more of the variance in Latino administrative appointments than controlling for 
multi-minority school boards.  Including Latino population growth increases the degree 
to which Latinos appear to be able to translate their population numbers into 
administrative positions, with Latinos getting a .498 percentage point boost in their 
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administrative positions with each additional percentage point increase in the population 
(compared to the .333 point boost suggested in the Table 4.1). 
 
 
Table 4.4 
Latino Population Growth and the Substantive  
Representation of Latinos on Local School Boards 
OLS Estimates 
  
Dependent Variable= % Latino Administrators 
  
Independent Variables:   
.498** 
(0.04) 
Latino Population 
  
.036** 
(0.007) 
Latino Education  
  
.311** 
(0.055) 
% Latino Board Members 
  
-.463** 
(0.093) 
Latino Population Growth 
  
% Latino Board Members “X” -.016** 
Latino Population Growth (0.004) 
    
4.401 
(3.231) 
Majority Latino Board 
  
-1.341** 
(0.222) 
Constant 
  
    
N 1372 
F 196.79 
R2 0.85 
(robust standard errors in parentheses) 
^p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 
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When Latino population growth is held at 0, we see that Latinos can expect to 
see a .311 point gain in their share of administrative for each percentage point increase 
in their level of school board representation.  However, Latino population growth has a 
negative interactive effect with Latino school board representation.  This, combined with 
the finding that Latino population growth has a negative and significant direct effect as 
well, raises serious concerns about the extent to which Latinos are able to gain access to 
administrative positions in communities which are characterized by high rates of Latino 
population growth.  
 Figure 4.2 illustrates how the positive effect of Latino board membership on the 
percentage of Latino administrators differs at alternative rates of Latino population 
growth.  Once again, a substantive example may allow for a clearer interpretation of 
these results.  Accordingly, let us examine how Latinos would be able to translate their 
descriptive representation on a school board into increased administrative appointments 
in three hypothetical districts, each of which have a seven-member board with Latinos 
holding two seats (or approximately 28%).  In the first hypothetical district the size of 
the Latino population remained unchanged between 1990 and 2000.  Within that district, 
Latinos should expect to see their political representation net them 8.7 percentage points 
more Latino administrators than they would have in a district in which they were 
excluded from the school board.  The second district saw the Latino population grow by 
3.7 percentage points (which is the mean rate of growth for all districts included in this 
sample).  There, Latinos are able to translate their political clout into an increase in more 
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administrative positions of 5.3 percentage points, a substantial decrease from the 8.7 
points they would expect when the size of the Latino population remained constant.   
As I mentioned earlier, districts in which Latinos and African-Americans serve 
on the school board simultaneously have enjoyed much higher rates of Latino population 
growth than the average district.  To be more specific, multi-minority board districts  
have seen the Latino population grow by 7.8 percentage points (compared to an overall 
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mean of 3.7).  Table 4.1 suggests that Latinos are less able to convert school board seats 
into administrative positions in multi-minority board districts.  If we only consider how 
Latino population growth affects this relationship in such districts we come to a similar 
conclusion.  Holding Latino population growth at 7.8 percentage points, Latinos can 
expect to see a boost of 1.6 point in their administrative appointments when they 
comprise 28% of the school board compared to what they would expect if they held no 
seats.  Not only is this figure considerably lower than the 8.7 point boost we expect to 
see in districts with no Latino population growth, but it is also remarkably lower than the 
4.6 point boost predicted for these same districts by the model in Table 4.1.  Thus, 
although they differ about the degree to which Latinos will be hampered in their ability 
to convert their descriptive representation into substantive representation, the models 
presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.4 both predict that Latinos will find themselves worse off 
in multi-minority board districts.    
 Table 4.5 presents a single model which accounts for both explanations in order 
to determine which force, Latino population growth or multi-minority school boards, is 
responsible for the diminished ability of Latinos to gain access to administrative 
positions.  The results show that variables measuring Latino population growth and its 
interactive effect with Latino school board representation continue to have a negative  
influence on the substantive representation of Latinos.  The substantive effect of Latino 
population growth also changes little in this model.  However, the interaction between 
Latino board representation and the simple dummy variable which accounts for whether 
or not Latinos and African-Americans serve on the board simultaneously is no longer 
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Table 4.5 
The Substantive Representation of Latinos on  
Local School Boards: Testing Competing Explanations 
OLS Estimates  
 
Dependent Variable= % Latino Administrators 
 
Independent Variables:  
 
 
Latino Population .493** 
(.040) 
 
Latino Education   .033** 
(.007) 
 
% Latino Board Members  .339** 
(.060) 
 
Latinos and Blacks on the Board  -.085 
(1.718) 
 
% Latino Board Members “X” 
Latinos and Blacks on the Board  
-.105 
(.084) 
 
Latino Population Growth  -.454** 
(.092) 
 
% Latino Board Members “X” 
Latino Population Growth  
-.014** 
(.004) 
 
Majority Latino Board  2.824 
(3.608) 
 
Constant  -1.247** 
(.214) 
 
  
N 1372 
F 158.9 
R2 .86 
(robust standard errors in parentheses) 
^p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01  
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significant, although the direction remains negative.  Taken together with the 
observation made earlier that the Latino population growth model (Table 4.4) explains 
more of the variance in Latino administrative appointments than the multi-minority 
board model  presented in Table 4.1 (.854 compared to .825), we have evidence that 
Latino population growth is a more robust predictor.  
 Lastly, I consider the possibility that there is a three-way interactive effect 
between Latino school board representation, Latino population growth, and multi-
minority boards.  The results presented in Table 4.6 find no evidence for this hypothesis.  
This is not surprising, given that this model suffers from severe multicollinarity (mean 
VIF= 75.53).   
Conclusion  
This chapter sought to determine whether African-American – Latino relations 
are characterized by cooperation or conflict within the legislative stage of the education 
policymaking process.  Within education, this is done by examining whether African-
Americans and Latinos are better or less able to substantively represent their group’s 
interest on school boards on which both groups serve.  Drawing on work from the urban 
politics literature, substantive representation is conceptualized as the relationship 
between descriptive representation on the school board and descriptive representation 
among school administrators.  The findings offer no evidence that the substantive 
representation of African-Americans is effected by the presence of Latinos on the board.  
However, Latino political representation has less of a positive impact on the percentage 
of Latino administrators when they serve on boards alongside African-Americans. 
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Table 4.6 
An Interactive Model of the Substantive Representation of 
Latinos on Local School Boards 
OLS Estimates  
 
Dependent Variable= % Latino Administrators 
 
Independent Variables:  
 
 
Latino Population .492** 
(.041) 
 
Latino Education   .033** 
(.007) 
 
% Latino Board Members  .342** 
(.062) 
 
Latinos and Blacks on the Board  .013 
(1.666) 
 
% Latino Board Members “X” 
Latinos and Blacks on the Board  
-.138 
(.090) 
 
Latino Population Growth  -.455** 
(.092) 
 
% Latino Board Members “X” 
Latino Population Growth  
-.014** 
(.004) 
 
% Latino Board Members “X” 
Latino Population Growth “X” 
Latinos and Blacks on the Board  
 
.003 
(.009) 
 
Majority Latino Board  -2.709 
(3.601) 
 
Constant -1.247** 
(.214) 
 
 
N 1372 
F 154.53 
R2 .86 
(robust standard errors in parentheses) 
^p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01  
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An alternative hypothesis suggests that Latinos will be hurt in terms of 
substantive representation in areas where the rate of Latino population growth is high.  
The empirical results confirm this hypothesis.  Given current demographic trends, 
population growth will continue to have a significant impact on the representation of 
Latino community for years to come.  While the size of the African-American 
population has remained relatively constant in recent years, the Latino community 
enjoys extremely high rates of growth both in the Southwest and in areas which have not 
had traditionally large Latino populations.  
When both explanations are pitted against each other, Latino population growth 
retains significance while the hypothesis pertaining to multi-minority school boards does 
not.  The findings in this chapter underscore an often ignored point in the study of racial 
and ethnic politics:  Competing explanations of the same phenomenon are often 
empirically, if not theoretically, related to one another.  Therefore, studies which do not 
consider multiple explanations within the same model cannot make definitive statements 
about causality and run a serious risk of reporting spurious results.   
Within this chapter, we note that the diminished ability of Latinos to translate 
their descriptive representation into substantive representation in districts where both 
Latinos and African-Americans serve on the board is likely a function of the high rates 
of Latino population growth which also characterizes such districts.  While not as blatant 
an example of potential spuriousness, the previous chapter demonstrates that scholars 
who fail to consider the role of partisanship in the formation of interracial coalitions in 
local school board elections are likely to come up with markedly different results than 
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those who do.  Thus, the larger point may be that works in this field continue suffer from 
omitted variable basis.  While this work is undoubtedly not exempt from this criticism, 
largely because of the limited theoretical development on this topic, scholars must 
continue to recognize such limitations and attempt to compensate for them in whatever 
manner they can.  
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CHAPTER V 
AFRICAN-AMERICANS, LATINOS, AND SECOND-GENERATION 
DISCRIMINATION 
 
In recent years, significant scholarly attention has been paid to the determinants 
of minority representation among elected school boards, administrators, and teaching 
facilities.  Mere descriptive representation, however, has not been viewed as an end-in-
itself.  Rather, it is valued because such representation, through a variety of casual 
mechanisms, can serve to better the education of minority children.  Despite such an 
understanding, the exact way in which African-Americans – Latino relations actually 
affect educational outputs, and the way in which African-Americans – Latino relations 
affect policy implementation and outcomes more generally, is relatively understudied 
compared to other areas, such as public opinion and electoral competition.  In this 
chapter we turn to the issue of minority student performance and examine how the 
African-American - Latino relations affect the education that minority children receive 
in multiracial school districts.  Three basic theories are used in order to determine the 
conditions under which minority children will face discrimination and receive inferior 
education.  The first are theories of racial context, specifically those developed by 
Rodney Hero (1998; Hero and Tolbert 1996).  Second, I turn to broader theories of race 
relations and the intersectionality of race and socioeconomic status.  Such theories are 
typically meant to apply to Anglo-black or Anglo-Latino relations, but carry clear 
implications for relations in tri-racial settings as well.  Lastly, I turn to the theory of 
representative bureaucracy, derived largely form work by Ken Meier and his co-authors 
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(Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991b; Meier, Wrinkle, and 
Polinard 1999), in order to explain how the demographic composition of a school’s 
faculty can change the nature of education for minority students.    
In their influential work, Baumgartner and Jones (1993) argue that politics and 
policy-making are dominated by laws of negative feedback.  Most policy arenas, they 
argue, are characterized by stability, exhibiting only modest change over time.  Yet, at 
times policy subsystems are hit with shocks, or “punctuations,” which disturb the status-
quo and create a new equilibrium.  Within the context of the education policy, one would 
be hard-pressed to find a better example of such a punctuation than the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas.  Even in this example, 
however, the force of negative feedback is evident.  While Brown was poised to redefine 
the nature of minority education within the United States, the system looks only 
marginally different in 2006 than it did fifty years earlier.        
The positive effect of the Brown decision on the success of minority students was 
softened by several other trends within the public schools.  While segregation within 
school districts has decreased in the fifty years since Brown, there has been a well 
documented increase in the level of segregation between school districts (Clotfelter 
2004).  Even when minority children attend schools which are racially integrated, 
segregation may again emerge in the form of academic grouping, a phenomenon also 
referred to as “second-generation discrimination.” 
In essence, second-generation discrimination refers to the use academic grouping 
and discipline in a discriminatory manner so that students from one racial/ethnic group 
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are separated from another (Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Meier and Stewart 
1991b; Wright, Hirlinger, and England 1998).  Such practices have largely been viewed 
as a response to the school integration movement of the late 1960s (Harry and Anderson 
1994; Wright, Hirlinger, and England 1998).  Facing the racial integration of schools 
within districts, academic grouping provides a way for racial groups to be kept separate 
while remaining in fully “integrated” schools.  Such practices have lead to legal 
challenges, including the 1979 case Larry P. et al. v. Wilson Riles et al., in which a San 
Francisco school district was accused of discriminating against five African-American 
students who had been placed in special education classes.  In that district, African-
Americans comprised 29% of the student population, yet comprised 66% of students 
enrolled in educable mentally retarded classes.  While the plaintiffs in Larry P. and other 
similar cases filed in the 1970s were successful, the use of academic grouping has 
continued.  Harry and Anderson (1994, 603) write, “since those early years, the 
phenomenon of overrepresentation of African-Americans in special education, and their 
corresponding under-representation in programs for the gifted and talented, has 
continued unabated.”  This observation has been confirmed and extended to other 
racial/ethnic minorities by multiple studies within education, sociology, and political 
science (Bullock and Stewart 1978a, 1978b; England and Meier 1985; Epstein 1986; 
Eyler, Cook, and Ward 1983; Fierros and Conroy 2002; Finn 1982; Ford and Webb 
1994; Gregory 1995; Jones and Menchetti 2001; Mehan, Villanueva, Hubbard, and Lintz 
1996; Meier 1984; Meier and England 1984; Meier, Steward, and England 1989; Meier 
and Stewart 1991b; Oswald, Coutinho, and Best 2002; Shaw and Braden 1990; Stewart 
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and Bullock 1981; Wright, Hirlinger, and England 1998; but see Wainscott and 
Woodard 1988).     
Regardless of whether segregation occurs within districts, between districts, or 
within schools, the result is the same.  As Gartner and Lipsky (1987, 368) note, “the 
assumptions underlying separate programs have produced a system that is both 
segregated and second class.”  Once enrolled in remedial classes, studies have shown 
that student performance begins to drop steadily below what one would predict given 
past achievement and a student’s demographic background (Braddock and Dawkins 
1993; Lee and Bryk 1998; Mehan, Villanuea, Hubbard, and Lintz 1996; Oakes 1985).  
Likewise, the application of discipline measures, either in the form of corporal 
punishment, suspension, or expulsion without total cessation of educational services, has 
been found to lower achievement and encourage dropouts (Ekstrom, Goertz, Pollack, 
and Rock 1986; Skiba and Peterson 1999).   
Racial Context 
One contributor to second generation discrimination may be social diversity.  
Within the field of political behavior, scholars have long hypothesized that greater 
minority group size results in increasingly prejudicial attitudes on the part of non-
minorities (Giles 1977; Giles and Bunker 1993; Glaser 1994; Tolbert and Grummel 
2003).  In its simplest form, the hypothesis suggests that “a superordinate group (e.g., 
whites) becomes more racially hostile as the size of the proximate subordinate group 
increases, which punitively threatens the former’s economic and social privilege” 
(Oliver and Wong 2003).  The notion that prejudicial attitudes are more likely to form in 
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diverse environments, however, stands in contrast to other works which finds that social 
contact, which is presumably higher in diverse environments, reduces prejudice 
(Aberbach and Walker 1973; Ellison and Powers 1994; Meer and Feedman 1966; 
Schuman and Hatchett 1974; Sigelman and Welch 1993; Voss and Miller 2001; 
Williams 1964; Welch and Sigelman 2000).  Social contact, these studies argue, makes it 
difficult for groups to accept typically negative stereotypes and also increases the 
probability of both groups holding shared values.   
Early work by St. John and Lewis (1971) argues that student achievement for 
both African-Americans and Anglos is lower in diverse schools.  In a more contempory 
study, however, Oswald, Coutinho, and Best (2002) find that the classification of 
African-American students as mentally retarded tends to decrease as the size of the non-
white population grows, implying that diversity tends to reduce discrimination against 
African-Americans and other racial/ethnic minorities.   
Additional insights on education equity may be gained from Hero’s (1998; Hero 
and Tolbert 1996) work on the influence of racial/ethnic diversity on public policy.  
While Hero’s policy indicators are taken at the state-level, those that pertain to education 
(e.g. minority suspension and graduation ratios) are more appropriately measured at 
other units of analysis, such as school districts.  Hero (1998; Tolbert and Hero 2001) has 
demonstrated that his state-level theory of social diversity can be applied at to sub-state 
units, further suggesting that racial context may influence the level of educational equity, 
including second-generation discrimination, within school districts.  In the end, Hero 
(1998, 88) concludes that “the little racial/ethnic diversity that exists in homogenous 
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environments is associated with relatively worse [education] policy outcomes for 
minorities.”  He argues that this occurs because homogeneous environments are 
characterized by “consensual pluralism,” and political disputes are unlikely revolve 
around issues of racial/ethnic equity.  In the end, both Oswald et al. (2002) and Hero 
(1998; Hero and Tolbert 1996) argue that, contrary to the predictions of the threat 
hypothesis, diversity is likely to be positively related to educational equity.  Inequity, 
then, will be most likely to occur in homogenous districts, where issues are rarely 
framed in racial/ethnic terms and minorities lack the numbers to shape the political 
process.  This leads to the following hypothesis regarding the influence of racial context 
on second generation discrimination: 
Racial/Ethnic diversity will be negatively related to second-generation discrimination.  
Racial/Ethnic Social Status 
While theories of racial context revolve largely around levels of diversity or 
minority group size, threat to a “superordinate group’s economic and social privilege” 
can come about through a variety of other means.  In order to fully understand race 
relations, one must also consider the relative socioeconomic position of groups relative 
to one another.  High-SES minority groups may enjoy more stable leadership and find 
themselves increasingly in competition with Anglos for similar jobs and positions of 
political influence.  Contrary to this expectation, however, the Feagin (1980)/Giles and 
Evans (1985) argument states that the better situated minority groups are, relative to 
Anglos, the less that minority groups will be targeted for discrimination.  One of the 
reasons this for this relationship is that equal social status results in an increased 
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probability of minorities holding shared values with Anglos.  There is an alternative, 
perhaps simpler, explanation as to why increased minority socioeconomic status might 
result in lower levels of discrimination: discrimination is easier to perpetrate against 
individuals with few socioeconomic resources.  Thus, while the presence of such 
resources may increase feelings of threat among superordinate groups (typically 
Anglos), it also serves to limit the extent to which hostile attitudes can be translated into 
discriminatory behavior, as minority groups will be more apt to challenge discriminatory 
behavior through political or legal means.   
In their work, Meier and Stewart (1991b) observe that there is a tradeoff between 
the level of second-generation discrimination which Latinos and African-Americans are 
subject to.  Specifically, they argue that Latinos fare better in multiracial school districts 
because Anglos are more liable to target African-Americans for discrimination.  In other 
words, in districts where African-Americans find themselves disproportionately 
represented in academic groupings, Latinos are more likely to find themselves 
proportionately represented.  Meier and Stewart (1991b) speculate that this relationship 
is a function of the greater social resources available to Latinos, which result in more 
collegial relations with Anglos than African-Americans typically enjoy.  This 
observation also serves to bring up a larger point: in multiracial settings, the nature of 
the relationship between one minority group and Anglos is partially dependent upon the 
nature of the relationship between Anglos and other minority groups.     
When Latinos more closely resemble Anglos in terms of socioeconomic status, 
African-Americans are more likely to be targeted for discrimination.  While Meier and 
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Stewart (1991b) assume that Latinos will possess the socioeconomic edge in most 
multiracial settings, recent demographic trends, such as the immigration of unskilled 
Latinos into the states such as North Carolina and Georgia, call into question whether 
this will be the case in all settings.  When it is not the case, and African-Americans are 
the group which most resemble Anglos in terms of socioeconomic status, Latinos may 
find that they are more regularly subject to second-generation discrimination, generating 
the following hypotheses: 
The smaller the disparity between African-American and Anglo socioeconomic status, 
the less African-Americans will be subject to second-generation discrimination.    
 
The smaller the disparity between Latinos and Anglo socioeconomic status, the less 
Latinos will be subject to second-generation discrimination.    
 
The smaller the disparity between African-American and Anglo socioeconomic status, 
relative to the disparity between Latinos and Anglos, the less African-Americans will be 
subject to second-generation discrimination.    
 
The smaller the disparity between Latinos and Anglo socioeconomic status, relative to 
the disparity between African-Americans and Anglos, the less Latinos will be subject to 
second-generation discrimination.    
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Representative Bureaucracy  
Scholars since Kingsley (1944) have considered how the demographic makeup of 
public organizations affects the policy outputs.  Much of the work in this area has 
focused on the theory of representative bureaucracy.  The essential hypothesis within the 
representative bureaucracy literature is that greater passive representation for some 
group, or the extent to which some group is employed by a public organization, leads to 
outputs which are in the expressed or understood interest of that group.  While this basic 
hypothesis has been tested and confirmed on numerous occasions for a variety of groups, 
including African-Americans (Meier and Stewart 1992; Hindera 1993a), Latinos (Meier 
1993; Hindera 1993b), Asian-Americans (Selden 1997), Native-Americans (Wright, 
Hirlinger, and England 1998), and females (Keiser et al. 2002),  scholars continue the 
debate the circumstances under which passive representation is most likely to translate 
into active presentation.    
Organizational socialization and occupational professionalization, for example, 
are thought to limit importance of demographics within public agencies (Meier and 
Nigro 1976; Mosher 1982).  Thompson (1976, 215) argues that active representation is 
most likely to occur when minority officials “deal with issues which have patent 
ramification for the well-being of their race.”  Minority officials, Thompson argues, 
involved in determining eligibility requirements for welfare recipients will enjoy a much 
clearer understanding of the implications of their actions for the well-being of minorities 
in general compared to officials at the Maritime Administration.  Thompson further 
reasons that representation will occur when minorities occupy jobs low within the 
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hierarchy of an organization, which are typically characterized by relatively high degrees 
of behavioral discretion.   
Judging from Thompson’s criteria, public schools are organizations in which the 
predictions of the representative bureaucracy hypothesis are likely to prove true.  Unlike 
the Maritime Administration, most minority educators are likely aware of the importance 
of education and the ability of educational quality to affect everything from future 
income (Cohen and Tyree 1986) to incarnation rates (Osher, Woodruff, and Sims 2002).  
Moreover, the relatively high level of discretion possessed by teachers (the street-level 
bureaucrat of the education system) affords them the opportunity to actively represent 
the interests of certain groups.  Thus, it is not necessarily surprising that several studies 
have shown a positive relationship between minority representation on teaching faculties 
and minority student success, however defined (Barajas and Pierce 2001; Irvine 1989; 
Meier 1993; Meier and Stewart 1991b; Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Meier, 
Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999; Polinard, Wrinkle, and Longoria 1990; Polinard, Wrinkle, 
and Meier 1995; Wright, Hirlinger, and England 1998).  
However, the literature on representative bureaucracy, both inside and outside of 
the education system, has largely ignored how minority passive representation within 
governmental organizations benefits minority clientele in a multi-minority context.  
While it is well established that a minority group’s clientele benefit from the presence of 
co-ethnic bureaucrats, it is unknown whether these benefits extend to non-co-ethnic 
minorities as well.  That is, are African-Americans advantaged by the descriptive 
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representation of Latinos? Conversely, are Latinos advantaged by the descriptive 
representation of African-Americans?12  
There are several reasons to suspect that the dynamic of Black/Brown 
competition noted in other works (e.g. Selden 1997, 93) may not apply to street-level 
bureaucrats, particularly teachers, implementing policies.  First, Meier et al. (2004) 
contend that Black/Brown competition is most likely to occur in zero-sum situations 
(e.g. disputes over descriptive representation in political offices or civil service jobs), 
where success by one group would necessarily limit opportunities for others.  The focus 
of this present study, second-generation discrimination, is largely exempt from the 
concerns over resource scarcity which may be present in other areas.  For example, with 
regards to discipline, the failure of one student to be suspended does not necessitate the 
suspension of another student.  It is equally unlikely that failing to assign one student to 
a special education class would force other students to be assigned.  Such non-zero-sum 
situations should work to foster inter-minority cooperation, rather than promote conflict.  
Second, there is some evidence that Anglo students benefit from more diverse teaching 
facilities, opening the possibility the benefits of representative bureaucracy extend to 
non-co-ethnics (Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999).  Lastly, unlike other situations, 
organizational socialization and professionalization may work to limit the use of second-
                                                 
12 Selden, Brudney, and Kellough (1998) provide evidence that an increase in the 
number minority supervisors employed by the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) is 
associated with an increase in the percent of loan eligibility decisions favoring 
minorities. However, as these results are not broken down into specific racial or ethnic 
groups, it remains unclear whether this result is primarily driven by African-American 
supervisors favoring African-American farmers and Latino supervisors favoring Latino 
farmers, or whether minority supervisors acted favorably toward all minority farmers.  
 
101  
generation discrimination tactics.  Professionalization should work to create 
environments where procedures for discipline and academic groups are standardized, 
allowing less opportunity for second-generation discrimination to occur.  Where there 
are obvious violations of standardized procedures, teachers who are sensitive to the issue 
of racial/ethnic equity may report them, regardless of whether the victims are African-
American or Latino.  
Increased African-American representation on teaching faculties will be associated with 
lower levels of second generation discrimination among African-American students.  
 
Increased Latino representation on teaching faculties will be associated with lower 
levels of second generation discrimination among Latino students.  
 
Increased Latino representation on teaching faculties will be associated with lower 
levels of second generation discrimination among African-American students.  
 
Increased African-American representation on teaching faculties will be associated with 
lower levels of second generation discrimination among Latino students.   
Modeling Second Generation Discrimination 
The Office for Civil Rights periodically gathers data regarding academic 
grouping, discipline, and educational attainment.  The national sample of school districts 
conducted by the OCR in 2000 is used for this study.  Supplemental data regarding the 
demographic makeup of each district was obtained from the 2000 census.  Census data 
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includes the racial composition of each district and the average level of socioeconomic 
resources present in each community by race.  Lastly, the racial composition of teaching 
faculties was obtained from the National Latino Education Study.  As the hypotheses 
require that districts have both African-American and Latino students, only districts with 
a student population which is at least one-percent African-American and one-percent 
Latino are included in the analysis.  Within the sample, the mean percentage of Latino 
students is 18, while the mean percentage of African-American students is 16.   
Discriminatory implementation practices are measured via an “odds ratio,” which 
takes account of the relative odds of some group being disproportionately grouped or 
disciplined.13  These ratios measure African-American and Latino grouping for Gifted 
and Talented programs, suspension rates, and classifications as mildly retarded.  In order 
to illustrate the odds index, let us assume that we are attempting to calculate the odds of 
Latino students being disproportionately classified as mildly retarded.  The index is 
calculated in the following manner:   
(# of Latino Students Classified as Mildly Retarded / # of Latino Students) / 
(Total # of Students Classified as Mildly Retarded / Total # of Students) 
Assume that a district has a total enrollment of 100 students, 25 of which are Latino.  
The district also has 10 students classified as mildly retarded, 5 of which are Latino.  
20% of Latino students are classified as mildly retarded, whereas the district average is 
10%.  This results in a value of 2 for the odds index, indicating that Latino students are 
                                                 
13 Similar measures have been used by several other studies of academic grouping and 
second generation discrimination (e.g. Finn 1982; Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; 
Meier and Stewart 1991a; Polinard, Wrinkle, and Longoria 1990; Wright, Hirlinger, and 
England 1998; but see Wainscott and Woodard 1988).  
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twice as likely to be classified as mildly retarded than the average student in the district.  
Several of the indexes, however, are skewed by extreme variables (a typical problem 
when using an odds ratio in this setting, see Finn 1982; Meier, Stewart, and England 
1989; Meier and Stewart 1991b; Polinard, Wrinkle, and Longoria 1990; Wright, 
Hirlinger, and England 1998).  As extreme values can distort regression results by 
assigning too much weight to an outlying observation, each index is subject to a log 
transformation.  Accordingly, the resulting coefficients must be interpreted as percentage 
changes in the dependent variable, not one-unit changes (Tufte 1974).  In order to further 
ensure that the results are not driven by outlying cases, robust regressions are used for 
estimation.14   
The first hypothesis proposes that the level of second-generation discrimination 
within a district is contingent upon the level of racial/ethnic diversity.  As this 
hypotheses is taken directly from Hero’s (1998) theory of social diversity, minority 
diversity is measured using an index identical to the one employed by Hero, which he 
adapts from a similar measure developed by Sullivan (1973).  The formula is as follows: 
1 – [(Latino Population)2 + (African-American Population)2 + (Anglo Population)2 + 
(Other Population)2].  In order to capture diversity within schools, all population 
measures are based upon student population figures, rather than school district residents.    
                                                 
14 As with the models presented in Chapters III and IV, I preformed diagnostics to in 
order to determine if the errors terms between the models for African-Americans and 
Latinos were correlated, warranting the use of Seeming Unrelated Regressions.  The 
results of the Breusch-Pagan tests indicate that for each of the three sets of equations 
correlated errors are not an issue.  
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Socioeconomic disparities between African-Americans/Latinos and Anglos are 
measured using a series of income and education ratios (African-American per capita 
income/Anglo per capita income;  % African-American College Graduates/% African-
American College Graduates; Latino per capita income/Anglo per capita income; % 
Latino College Graduates/% Anglos College Graduates).  Higher ratios should result in 
lower levels of discrimination.  Extending the socioeconomic argument into a multi-
minority context, each model of second-generation discrimination among African-
Americans students contains a measure of the difference between the African-
American/Anglo and Latino/Anglo SES ratios.  Likewise, each model of second-
generation discrimination among Latino students contains a measure of the difference 
between the Latino/Anglo and African-American/Anglo SES ratios.  According to 
theories of race relations in multiracial areas, the more that one minority group 
resembles Anglos, the more likely that other minority groups will be targeted for 
discrimination.  Hypotheses relating to representative bureaucracy are tested by 
accounting for the percentage of African-American and Latino teachers within a school 
district.   
Lastly, the level of professionalization within a school district is also likely to 
affect the degree to which academic grouping is used as a means of discrimination 
against African-American and Latino students.  Presumably, greater professionalization 
should result in a greater resistance toward using academic groupings for purposes other 
than their original educational function, such as second generation discrimination.  
Lacking a direct measure of professionalization, the size of the school district is included 
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in each model (larger school districts are assumed to be more professionalized, see 
Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991b; Wright, Hirlinger, and 
England 1998).  Size is measured by the total number of the students (in thousands) 
enrolled within a district.   
Findings 
Table 5.1 provides descriptive statistics for each of the measures of second 
generation discrimination used in the analysis.  African-Americans appear to be the most 
dramatically affected by academic grouping.  They are nearly twice as likely to be 
suspended (odds index=1.89) or classified as mildly retarded (odds index=1.92), while 
only half as likely to be enrolled in a gifted and talented program (odds index=.47).  
Latinos, at least in this sample, are worse off than African-Americans in terms of gifted 
and talented programs (odds index=.44); they are, however, in a far better position in 
terms of suspensions and mildly retarded classifications.   
 
Table 5.1  
Second-Generation Discrimination among Minority Students 
 
      Mean  Std. Dev.  
  
African-American GT Ratio    .47  .37   
 
Latino GT Ratio     .44  .30   
 
African-American Mild Retardation Ratio 1.92  1.53   
 
Latino Mild Retardation Ratio  .93  1.11   
 
African-American Suspension Ratio  1.89  .89   
 
Latino Suspension Ratio   1.02  .54  
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Table 5.2 presents the results regarding the determinants of second generation 
discrimination among African-Americans.  School district size is unrelated each odds 
index presented.  In support of the hypothesis regarding the effect of racial context on 
second generation discrimination, minority diversity is negatively related to mild 
retardation classifications and suspensions, providing further evidence that academic 
grouping is less likely to occur in non-white districts even when controlling for the 
presence of minority teachers.  Greater socioeconomic resources, relative to Anglos, 
typically result in more equitable levels of academic grouping for African-Americans.  
Moreover, there is some indications that African-American discrimination is dependent 
upon the disparity between Latino/Anglo SES as well as African-American/Anglos SES.  
Specifically, African-American enrollment in Gifted and Talented programs increases 
with the difference between the African-American College Education Ratio and the 
Latino College Education Ratio.   
In support of the expectations set forth in the representative bureaucracy 
literature, the presence of African-American teachers is found to result in more equitable 
implementation practices for African-Americans for all three measures of second-
generation discrimination.  Interestingly, an increase in the percentage of Latino teachers 
results in lower levels of second generation discrimination against African-Americans 
for two of the three measures, GT placement and Mild Retardation.  In the case of GT 
placements, the presence of Latino teachers appears to help African-American students 
to a greater degree than does African-American representation (for GT placement: 
African-American teachers coefficient = 1.45, while Latino teachers coefficient = 2.48).   
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Table 5.3 presents the results regarding the determinants of second generation 
discrimination among Latino students.  Total enrollment, a proxy for professionalization, 
is again unrelated to GT placements and mild retardation classifications; however it is 
positively related to the Latino/Anglo suspensions ratio.  Likewise, minority diversity 
appears to only be related to the suspensions ratio, with diversity proving to be 
negatively related to Latino overrepresentation.  Consistent with the results for African-
Americans, as Latinos look more like Anglos in terms of income, they are more likely to 
be placed in GT programs, and less likely to face suspensions.  As hypothesized, Latinos 
appear to benefit from a large gap between the Latino/Anglo and Black/Anglo income 
ratios.    
 Co-ethnic representation within the education system increases Latino 
assignment to GT classes, but does not influence any other grouping measure.  The 
presence of African-Americans on teaching facilities is also associated with a higher 
proportion of GT placements.  While the effect is smaller than that for Latino teachers, 
the presence of African-American teachers is more consistently related to lower levels of 
second-generation discrimination, affecting each of the three indicators used in this 
analysis.   
Conclusion 
 This study produces two primary findings.  First, it reaffirms the notion that 
racial discrimination is contingent upon socioeconomic status.  When minority groups 
look similar to Anglos, the level of discrimination they face within the education system 
is reduced.  However, the relative status of other minority groups matters as well.  When 
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the difference between African-Americans and Anglos is large, and the difference 
between Latinos and Anglos is small, African-Americans are especially vulnerable.  The 
same holds true for Latinos when the African-Americans find themselves relatively 
better off in terms of income and education.  Thus, as US schools become increasingly 
populated by children of color from a variety of backgrounds, it is important to 
remember that theories of race relations must move beyond Anglo – African-American 
or Anglo – Latino relations, and consider how multiple racial/ethnic groups interact, and 
how such interactions affect the lives of minority students differently.   
 Second, this study extends the literature on representative bureaucracy by 
examining whether minority students benefit from the presence of non-co-ethnic 
minorities on teaching facilities.  Surprisingly, the findings suggest that not only do non-
co-ethnic minority teachers lower levels of second generation discrimination among 
minority students; they do so consistently and with a substantive impact that 
occasionally rivals that of co-ethnic teachers.  Further work concerning the role 
perception of minority teachers toward non-co-ethnic minority students needs to be done 
in order to fully understand this relationship.  Together, these findings suggest that 
Black/Brown cooperation may be commonplace among bureaucrats charged with 
implementing public policy, at least in the case of education.  Meanwhile competitive 
forces remain at work within the larger environment external to the educational 
bureaucracy.   
 
111  
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 The nature of racial and ethnic politics in the United States is changing.  For 
most of American history, the political fate of American-Americans and Latinos has 
depended upon their relationship with the Anglo community.  As residential patterns 
have changed to create numerous multiracial areas within the United States, so has the 
potential for the formation of alternative racial coalitions. The possibility now exists for 
African-Americans and Latinos to form rainbow coalitions with one another, promoting 
the interests of both groups and increasing their mutual political success even when 
faced with opposition from a conservative Anglo community. But do they? This has 
been the central question of this project. The answer, as one might suspect, is sometimes. 
The question then becomes, what are the circumstances which promote or hamper the 
formation of rainbow coalitions? This project has suggested many possible 
circumstances, including socioeconomic conditions, electoral structure, changing 
demographic contexts, scarcity of resources, and organizational professionalism. Below 
I review the findings which this project produces and consider their implications for 
other literatures and future studies of inter-minority relations.  
 Regarding African-American and Latino conflict in the electoral arena, Chapter 
III shows that despite commonly held beliefs about the ideological similarity between 
African-Americans and Latinos, there is little evidence for the routine formation of 
rainbow coalitions in most school districts. Inter-minority conflict, not cooperation, 
remains the norm. Yet, Chapter III also demonstrates that the patterns of black-Latino 
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conflict have changed. Fifteen years ago, Meier and Stewart (1991a, 1991b) found that 
Anglo-Latino coalitions were an expected substitute for inter-minority ones. Borrowing 
from theories of social distance within sociology, Meier and Stewart (1991a) argued that 
Anglos would prefer to form coalitions with Latinos, whom Anglos feel are closer to 
themselves than African-Americans. Meier and Stewart’s work offers a compelling 
explanation as to why scholars have been unable to observe rainbow coalitions in the 
vast majority of urban areas across the United States. Its shortcoming, however, is its 
failure to account for the heterogeneity in the Latino population which results from the 
continuing immigration of foreign born Latinos into the United States.  
 The notion that Anglos prefer the political incorporation of Latinos over African-
Americans is predicated upon the assumption that Anglos believe Latinos most resemble 
themselves. This assumption, however, is unlikely to hold when the Latino population in 
question is comprised primarily of Latino immigrants, whose cultural and linguistic 
differences often outweigh the historical political animosity between Anglos and 
African-Americans. The result is that African-American incorporation onto local school 
boards is higher in districts with larger Latino non-citizen populations. As, Latino non-
citizens do not have the option to support African-American candidates, this relationship 
occurs because of the increased propensity of Anglos to support the incorporation of 
African-Americans into governing coalitions in such districts. Chapter III does not offer 
any illustrations of this process, beyond summarizing what we know about individual-
level attitudes of and towards Latino immigrants.  In-depth case studies of districts with 
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large African-American and Latino immigrant populations, thus, are one potentially 
fruitful avenue for further research.  
The most significant contribution of this study of interracial coalitions in local 
school board elections comes not from the discovery that Latino immigration 
fundamentally alters the dynamics of coalitional formations, after all the mechanism by 
which Latino immigration is thought to influence the process (social distance) is 
identical to the one hypothesized by Meier and Stewart (1991a, 1991b). Rather, the 
attention which this study pays to the way in which electoral structure fundamentally 
alters the nature of coalition building offers the greatest contribution to our knowledge of 
African-American and Latino relationships in the electoral arena.  
School board elections, because they offer such diversity in election rules, 
present an ideal case to examine how different structures, such as partisan systems, can 
influence interracial relations and coalitions. In the end, electoral structure is found to be 
an extremely important determinant of the formation of rainbow coalitions. All evidence 
of American-American and Latino electoral competition is confined to non-partisan 
systems. In partisan systems there is no evidence of inter-minority conflict; rather, what 
evidence does exist for the presence of interracial coalitions points towards rainbow 
coalitions.  Partisan affiliation, thus, can serve as a way to unite ideologically liberal 
racial and ethnic minorities. Meanwhile, individuals living in non-partisan systems are 
more likely to rely on racial cues which are easier to discern than ideological ones. As 
African-Americans and Latinos tend to express negative attitudes towards one another in 
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a variety of circumstances (see Mindiola et al. 2002), this limits the likelihood of a 
rainbow coalitions, instead producing inter-minority conflict.   
Even without the benefit of electoral support from other minority groups, 
partisan systems tend to be characterized by much higher levels of minority 
representation. That is, the ability of minority groups to translate population size into 
political representation is greatly increased under partisan systems. In fact, Chapter III 
suggests that minorities may be slightly overrepresented given their population size 
(although this is only true for Latinos if you discount the non-citizen population). Such 
benefits, however, remain confined to the relatively small number of districts 
(approximately 14%) that use such systems.  
 This finding is especially interesting given the complex and, at times, 
antagonistic relationship which has historically existed between minorities and the 
Democratic Party. Before the partisan realignment of the mid-1990s, the South, as well 
as much of the Southwest, functioned under a one-party system. With racially 
conservative Anglos denominating the Democratic Party in a number of states, 
minorities were forced to form minor parties and activist organizations, such as La Raza 
Unida or Black Panthers, achieving only isolated electoral success. Thus, throughout 
most of modern American history, partisanship has been a vehicle for minority 
disenfranchisement, not minority political success. In the mid-1990s, however, many 
racially conservative Anglos left the Democratic Party, which at the national-level had 
long changed its positions on many key racial issues, to join the Republicans (Lublin 
2004).  As a result, Democrats found themselves increasingly in need of minority votes. 
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Minorities responded by staging takeovers of many local Democratic Party chapters, 
while continuing to promote a liberal racial agenda. As Winter Garden states, “we 
wouldn’t have to change our philosophy or our politics or how we educate our kids just 
because we call ourselves Democrats” (Montejano 1987, 290). The result has been that, 
in contemporary Southern, Southwestern, and urban politics, minorities have become 
indispensable partners of the Democratic Party, and have been rewarded accordingly in 
areas with strong party organizations.             
Non-partisan systems originally gained popularity during the progressive 
movement as a way to depoliticize the education policymaking process. This is a task at 
which appear unsuccessful. As the results in Chapter III demonstrate, non-partisan 
elections redistribute electoral advantages and incentives for coalition building away 
from some groups (namely, African-Americans and Latinos) and towards others 
(Anglos). The election of school board members is a political process, and there is 
something to be gained by the use of electoral rules which acknowledge this reality.  
 The final finding of Chapter III is that the formation of different interracial 
coalitions differs in extremely heterogeneous contexts. African-Americans benefit from 
the presence of a large Latino population in districts where no individual racial/ethnic 
group comprises a majority of the population but the combined racial/ethnic minority 
population does. This is true even in non-partisan systems, where (as just noted) the 
probability inter-minority competition is high. Once again, only 3% of all districts meet 
this demographic criterion, so that in the vast majority of school districts within the 
United States, competition, not cooperation, remains the norm. Nevertheless, it is 
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important to see that African-Americans and Latinos do seem to enter into cooperative 
electoral relationships when the electoral structure in place facilitates it or the 
demographic context encourages it.   
 Chapter IV looks beyond the causes of interracial electoral coalitions, instead 
focusing on the nature of African-American and Latino relations within the legislative 
stage of the education policymaking process. As in many previous studies, Chapter IV 
shows that descriptive representation is tied to substantive representation, with the 
percentage of African-American administrators increasing along with the percentage of 
African-American school board members and similar patterns holding for Latinos. I 
expand on this finding, however, by examining whether African-Americans and Latinos 
are better or less able to substantively represent their group’s interest on school boards 
on which both groups serve.  
Borrowing from the urban politics literature, substantive representation is defined 
as the relationship between the presence of a minority group on the school board and the 
presence of members of that same group among school administrators and teachers. 
While there are numerous other ways in which one could potentially conceptualize 
substantive representation, I chose to rely on this measure in order to draw comparisons 
to previous studies in urban politics, many of which measure substantive representation 
as the percentage of minority municipal employees. Within the urban politics tradition, 
there is a clear pattern of the share of public jobs held by minorities increasing along 
with minority representation in elected office (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; 
Chandler and Gely 1995; Dye and Renick 1981; Eisinger 1982a, 1982b; Kerr and 
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Mladenka 1994; Mladenka 1989a, 1989b). This measure also has the advantage of 
meeting the definitions for several of types of substantive representation discussed in the 
literature, including Eulau and Karps (1977) descriptions of service responsiveness, 
symbolism, and policy responsiveness (Chapter IV offers a more elaborate discussion of 
this point).  
Given that Chapter III finds that electoral coalitions between African-Americans 
and Latinos are relatively rare, it is not surprising that Chapter IV offers no evidence of 
African-American and Latino legislative cooperation. Indeed, the findings suggest that 
the substantive representation of African-Americans is neither positively or negative 
effected by the presence of Latinos on the board.  For Latinos, however, political 
representation has less of a positive impact on the percentage of Latino administrators 
and teachers when they serve on boards alongside African-Americans. 
In order to come to a more complete understanding of Latino employment within 
the education system, Chapter IV also posits and tests an alternative hypothesis: Latinos 
will fare less well in terms of substantive representation in areas where the rate of Latino 
population growth is high. Administrative and teaching positions  exist within a “soft” 
zero-sum context in that districts do have the ability create additional slots, but the 
limited resources available to districts often seriously constrains their ability to do so. 
Providing positions to Latinos in line with their proportion of the population would 
require lowering the share for other groups, including African-Americans, and upsetting 
the status quo.   
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The results presented in Chapter IV confirm the contention that Latino 
population growth is a significant determinant of the extent to which Latinos will be able 
to achieve their desired level of substantive representation. This result holds 
considerable implications for the future of Latino politics. Unlike African-Americans, 
the Latino political experience is complicated by a rapidly growing population. While 
this is true in the Southwest, many areas of the country now find themselves 
encountering “emerging” Latino populations. These emerging populations are 
characterized not only by extremely high rates of growth, but also by low levels of 
citizenship, education, income, and fluency in English. As Chapter III demonstrates, 
Latino immigration plays a crucial role in interracial dynamics. Compounding 
immigration with extremely high growth rates, then, serves to further depress Latino 
political success in a number of districts throughout the United States.  
A final insight offered by Chapter IV is that the different contexts which Latinos 
create, dependent upon their nativity and growth rates, complicates the study of racial 
and ethnic politics in general and inter-minority competition in particular. For example, 
while both hypotheses presented in Chapter IV (that Latinos are less able to 
substantively represent their group’s interest on school boards on which African-
American serve and that Latinos fare less well in terms of substantive representation in 
areas where the rate of Latino population growth is high) are plausible, empirical tests 
are complicated by the fact that school districts in which Latinos serve on the board with 
African-Americans are precisely those districts which are also characterized by a 
relatively high rate of Latino population growth.  
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When both explanations are tested within the same model, Latino population 
growth retains significance while the hypothesis pertaining to multi-minority school 
boards does not, suggesting that the diminished ability of Latinos to translate their 
descriptive representation into substantive representation in districts where both Latinos 
and African-Americans serve on the board is likely a function of the high rates of Latino 
population growth which also characterizes such districts. This also highlights the 
importance of considering multiple explanations within the same model. This is 
especially true if the competing explanations correlate with each other very well. As 
Chapter IV warns, without such tests, one cannot make definitive statements about 
causality and run a serious risk of reporting spurious results.   
The final empirical chapter in this project is an examination of how African-
American – Latino relations affect levels of “second-generation discrimination” among 
minority students. The chapter began with a discussion of the theory of representative 
bureaucracy, which holds that public organizations become more responsive to the 
public’s interest as they become more representative of the public in terms of 
demographic characteristics because persons of comparable demographic backgrounds 
will possess comparable values due to similar socialization experiences. The theory of 
representative bureaucracy assumes that these values will influence bureaucratic 
decision making, especially when bureaucrats enjoy discretion in the implementation of 
policies. Education policy, then, provides an excellent opportunity to test this theory as it 
involves substantial discretion at all levels of implementation. 
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 Indeed, the theory of representative bureaucracy has found considerable support 
in a substantial body of literature examining education policy. Empirical research has 
found that increased minority representation among teachers and administrators is 
strongly associated with less discrimination, more favorable policies, and improved 
student performance (see Seldon 1997 for a review). Meier, Stewart, and England (1989) 
found that school districts with more African-American teachers adopted policies that 
were more beneficial for black students.  Likewise, Latino teacher representation has 
been found to reduce discriminatory policies toward Latino students and is linked with 
higher performance (Meier and Stewart 1991a, Meier 1993).    
   However, the literature on representative bureaucracy has not addressed whether 
minority passive representation within governmental organizations benefits minority 
clientele in a multi-minority context. Accordingly, Chapter V seeks to determine whether 
minorities benefit from the presence of non-co-ethnic minorities. In other words, are 
African-Americans advantaged by the descriptive representation of Latinos? Conversely, 
are Latinos advantaged by the descriptive representation of African-Americans? 
 Interestingly, Chapter V concludes that non-co-ethnic minority teachers do lower 
levels of second generation discrimination among minority students. In fact, they do so 
across multiple indicators, with the percentage of Latino teachers lowering the degree to 
which African-Americans are underrepresented in GT programs and overrepresented 
among students who are classified as mildly mentally retarded. African-Americans 
teachers, for their part, also appear to increase Latino placement in GT programs. 
Moreover, the substantive impact on non-co-ethnic minority teachers sometimes rivals 
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that of co-ethnic teachers, as Latino teachers appear to limit African-American exclusion 
from GT programs and mildly retarded classification to a larger extend than African-
American teachers. 
 There are several possible explanations for this finding. First, the presence of 
minorities, whether they are African-American or Latino, could serve to heighten 
awareness regarding issues pertaining to race within the education system, such as the 
increased propensity of minority students to be grouped into remedial programs. 
Likewise, minority teachers may perceive part of their role as monitoring grouping and 
discipline practices towards all traditionally disadvantaged groups, regardless of race or 
ethnicity. More work pertaining to role perception among minorities is needed in order 
to fully understand the casual mechanism behind this relationship.   
 While the presence of minority teachers is something which districts can 
influence, socioeconomic conditions are not (at least in the short term). However, 
Chapter V reaffirms that contention that racial discrimination is contingent upon 
socioeconomic status. Lower socioeconomic conditions for a minority group tend to be 
coupled with higher levels of second generation discrimination. Inter-minority tension 
can also be created as a result of socioeconomic conditions, with one group being 
especially vulnerable top discrimination when another minority group is closer to Anglos 
in terms of socioeconomic status   
This project offers a complex, but intuitively predictable, portrait of inter-
minority relations in urban school districts. Chapters III and IV offer little hope for those 
who wish to see minorities work together in order to maximize their political success. 
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Inter-minority competition exists, and Latinos appear to be the biggest losers of this 
phenomenon. Chapter V, however, indicates that inter-minority cooperation not only 
exists, but also plays a major role in preventing discrimination against minority students. 
The question is why, at the final stage of policymaking with the US education system, 
does the reality of inter-minority competition becomes overturned suddenly.   
It appears that scarcity of resources fosters competition between groups that 
might otherwise be expected to form cooperative relationships. School board seats are 
fixed, and an increase in the descriptive representation of one group necessarily lowers 
the amount of descriptive representation available for others.  Administrative and 
teaching positions are a similarly scarce resource.  Academic grouping and discipline 
policies, however, are relatively free from concerns relating to scarcity.  There is no 
minimum number of disciplinary actions which a district must take against its students, 
nor is there a minimum number of students which a district is required to classify as 
mentally retarded.  Together, these findings would seem to confirm the argument made 
by Meier et al. (2004) that inter-minority competition is most likely to occur in zero-sum 
situations, as well as work by McClain (1993), who finds that economic conditions 
engender competition.  
A second explanation is that the tendency of African-Americans and Latinos to 
enter into cooperative or competitive relationships is highly dependent upon the actors 
involved in the policymaking process.  At the early stages of the policymaking process, 
the actors, whether they be local elites attempting to forge an electoral coalition or 
school board members seeking to shape district policies, may view their constituencies 
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in very narrow terms.  Teachers, who are charged with the implementation of 
educational policies in the classroom, may be less prone to viewing themselves as 
charged with the promotion of one specific group’s well being.  Rather, professionalism 
among minorities may work to limit the use of second-generation discrimination tactics, 
regardless of which groups are being targeted.  If this is true, it would also explain why 
other works have found that more diverse teaching faculties are associated with high 
levels of student performance, regardless of the race of the student (Meier, Wrinkle, and 
Polinard 1999).    
Indeed, these findings also compliment the conclusions which urban politics 
scholars reached years ago concerning the relationship between race and the distribution 
of urban services.  Researchers such as Sjoberg, Brymer, and Ferris (1966) hypothesize 
that services are unequally distributed across urban areas, with areas containing high 
minority populations systematically receiving less services.  However, most other 
studies conclude that this is not the case (Howell 2000; Lineberry 1977; Mladenka 1980, 
1981; Mladenka and Hill 1978).  For example, Mladenka and Hill (1978) find that police 
response times do not vary based upon the racial or socioeconomic makeup of the 
neighborhood.  Rather, response time is a function of the gravity of the reported offense.  
Similarly, Mladenka (1980) argues that distribution patterns are a consequence of 
professional values and technical-rational criteria; he (1980, 997) concludes, 
“organizational rules provide a better explanation of who gets what than any 
combination of distinctly political and electoral variables.”    
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 Yet, Chapter V also suggests that Mladenka is partially incorrect.  
Socioeconomic conditions do partially determine the distribution of advantages and 
disadvantages within the educational system.  However, political relationships do 
manifest themselves differently, with African-American and Latino teachers forming 
cooperative, not competitive, relationships.  In short, the more insulated a set of actors 
are from the overtly political and electoral environment, the less emphasis they place on 
racial heuristics for determining of “who gets what when.”  While it is easy to see how 
electoral politics might be aided by the use of racial heuristics, street-level bureaucrats 
may interpret their mission in less competitive and cynical terms.  
Conclusion  
As Jennings (1997) states and Chapter I demonstrates, “it is clear that the bigger 
American cities and key electoral states are becoming increasingly populated by blacks 
and Latinos.” A proper understanding of how African-American–Latino relations 
operate is becoming increasingly necessary for scholars who desire to fully understand 
the dynamics of urban political bodies.  While several scholars have used survey data to 
understand the attitudinal foundation of inter-minority coalitions, (Jackson, Gerber, and 
Cain 1994; Garcia 2000), we know far less about how competition plays out in the 
bureaucracy and policymaking process (see McClain and Karnig 1990; McClain 1933; 
Meier and Stewart 1991b).  This project has offered the first systematic study of 
American-Americans and Latino cooperation and conflict at every stage of the 
policymaking process, from elections to policy outputs.  
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The last pages of Pursuing Power, the last major work collected on the subject of 
Latino Politics, Jennings (1997) lists several questions that the literature has thus far not 
fully addressed.  The one of these reads, “What conditions or factors lead to political 
cooperation or competition between black and Latino activists?” The answers appear to 
be many, and include electoral structure, resource scarcity, the actors involved in 
decision making, and social diversity. 
The approach this study has taken offers several advantages, and has 
substantially improved upon our understanding of whether African-American political 
success tends to benefit for hinder Latino political efforts and vice versa.  Yet, it remains 
limited in several respects.  Its reliance on quantitative methods provides evidence that 
the patterns of inter-minority relations discussed throughout this work are not 
idiosyncratic, a concern in other works which rely upon other forms of analysis in a 
handful of urban areas.   
Unfortunately, it also leaves us with an incomplete understanding of the nuances of 
inter-minority relations.  How do Anglo elites approach African-Americans when the 
Latino population within a district is comprised largely of immigrants?  Do they actively 
seek the incorporation of African-American candidates or are they more passive in 
process?  Similarly, are Latinos less likely to translate descriptive representation into 
substantive representation in districts where they serve on the board with African-
Americans because African-Americans actively compete with Latinos or because 
African-Americans are, for whatever reason, better able than Latinos to effectively 
represent their group’s interests (thereby limiting the potential resources available for 
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Latinos). Ultimately, this work is best approached in conjunction with other works that 
utilize elite interviews, focus groups, or in-depth case studies of select urban areas to 
understand the nature of African-American and Latino cooperation and conflict in urban 
school districts. 
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